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The debate on natural resource endowment and more equitable sustainable development is a priority on 
the public policy agenda of the countries of Latin America, in general, and those of the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR), in particular. South American countries possess some of the world’s most 
extensive mineral reserves: 65% of global reserves of lithium; 42% for silver; 38% for copper; 33% for 
tin; 21% for iron; 18% for bauxite and 14% for nickel. Their mineral potential is estimated to be even 
greater since only partial geological information is currently available. The subcontinent is also known to 
have vast oil reserves, especially since the certification of the extra-heavy crude reserves in the Orinoco 
Belt in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. It also accounts for approximately 30% of global renewable 
reserves of water, corresponding to over 70% of the water on the American continent. 
 
 This study was prepared by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) at the request of the Secretary-General of UNASUR and as part of the cooperation agreement 
signed by the two organizations in March 2012. 
 
 Natural resource governance is viewed by these two entities as playing a central role within their 
lines of work and as referring to the set of sovereign policies over ownership and allotment of natural 
resources and the distribution of productivity gains arising from their exploitation. This document seeks 
to provide useful information to enable countries to extend their contribution to more inclusive 
development and to shore up the equality agenda. 
 
 This publication identifies the different legal and economic instruments which States invoke in 
order to assert ownership of and distribute the revenue derived from the exploitation of mineral, water and 
hydrocarbon resources. These instruments include: legislation and special regulations; sectoral planning 
policies and regimes for public-private partnerships for investment and development; institutions created 
for regulatory purposes, mechanisms for the control and distribution of revenue from natural resources 
between levels of government; direct participation in the development of resources through public 
enterprises; public management and mechanisms for the resolution of socioenvironmental conflicts in 
mining sectors; creation of targeted public savings and investment funds (geared to investment in 
education, innovation and development, among others) and macrofiscal stabilization funds, as well as 
support for countercyclical macroeconomic management in response to cyclical fluctuations in the 
international prices for natural resource exports. 
 
 The subregion faces challenges and tensions arising from natural resource management and 
exploitation. In particular, States need to be more progressive in claiming their share of the windfall 
profits from mining —particularly given the length of the current boom— and in preserving the 
momentum of investment in this sector, as well as in the hydrocarbon and agricultural export sectors. The 
nations of our Great Homeland must report on the adjustments applied in the tax policy to the different 
sectors in order to make it more progressive, seek better coordination and avoid the fiscal competition that 
has the opposite impact. Lastly, the economic dilemmas implicit in the distribution and public investment 
of the revenues from natural resources between social groups and different levels of government must 




 Notwithstanding the foregoing, public policymakers of the countries in the subregion should 
direct their attention to two important issues: 
 
(1) The need to ensure efficient investment of the windfall earnings from natural resources, now 
that prices are buoyant, by developing mechanisms such as funds that can be used to avert 
any future price volatility or promote public investments in education, health, infrastructure 
and innovation and technological development, which in the final analysis can replace the 
extracted assets; 
 
(2) The need to improve public management of socioenvironmental conflicts that arise in the 
development of natural resource sectors. 
 
 South America is a net exporter of minerals and hydrocarbons and has abundant water resources 
that can be harnessed as a source of hydroelectricity, a clean and sustainable energy source. However, to 
make the most of their comparative advantages in the future, States must resume their proactive role and 
articulate with all social stakeholders the objectives of an equitable and sustainable energy policy. 
 
 Designed to respond to citizens’ demands, apprehensions and concerns, this policy should 
establish targets for providing access to energy to those economic sectors and social groups where it is 
lacking today. Thus, in each case the desirable and possible sources of supply must be defined, depending 
on the availability of resources and strategic economic, social and environmental considerations. 
 
 The design of policies to provide access to sufficient, good quality energy at affordable prices 
should lead to discussions on the incorporation of subsidies —both for facilitating access and for the 
purchase of modern and efficient equipment— in order to reduce the total energy expenditure of 
households and help to mitigate climate change. 
 
 The challenge in the hydrocarbon sector is to find a balance between public and private interests 
that will allow the investments needed to supply the domestic market and maintain the region’s export 
position. Institutional, regulatory and contractual innovations are needed to respond to the multiplicity of 
structural and cyclical factors that affect the current oil market, keeping in view the interests of the 
community, sovereignty and the public goods and services that this industry needs to contribute in the 
countries where it operates. 
 
 UNASUR countries have the opportunity to prioritize the drinking water and sanitation sector  
—in terms of both financing and efficient public policies for reducing poverty and indigence and 
fostering economic development and social inclusion. The improvements attained in this sector will also 
present new opportunities for the agricultural industries geared to exports and tourism as well as the 
protection of the environment. 
 
 The drinking water and sanitation sector calls for an effective long-term commitment to financing 
and to the construction of robust and stable institutions. Water has an economic value which must be 
internalized in the decisions of its users in order to build awareness of the fact that it is essential and 
scarce. To this end, States should design targeted subsidies to enable low-income users to meet their basic 




 The scale of service providers is crucial in lowering costs in the drinking water and sanitation 
sector. A good decision relating to economies of scale will result in lower prices for consumers. 
 
 In terms of natural resources, UNASUR proposes working to improve the sector’s capacity to 
adapt to climate change and higher energy costs. 
 
 It is indispensable to launch discussions on the challenges that natural resource-exporting 
countries in the region face in terms of public policies, the institutional framework and the regulation of 
ownership and the effective use of income. These challenges involve, among other governance functions, 
regulatory, fiscal and macroeconomic functions, strategic planning, public policy formulation and 
implementation and the management of socioenvironmental conflicts. In order to confront them and 
maximize their social benefit, institutional innovation must be fostered and the capacity for public 
management strengthened. 
 
 ECLAC views UNASUR as the appropriate forum for analysing these issues and for sharing 
policies and successful experiences or lessons learned. It is also the ideal setting for building the 
institutional framework needed to satisfy the urgent need to establish mechanisms for measurement and 
information and for generating precise, robust, comparable data that is consistent, relevant and available 
on a timely basis. Another significant challenge in this regard is the scant availability of information on 
certified reserves of non-renewable resources; in this regard, UNASUR countries could contemplate 
creating a subregional agency, based on current national geological, mining or similar institutions, for 
certifying reserves and exploring prospectuses, particularly of mining resources. 
 
 Information is essential for the adoption of policy and regulatory decisions. It allows for the 
adoption of management indicators for measuring the performance of providers, assessing their efficiency 
and detecting best practices, among others. 
 
 Any advance towards the sustainable and equitable exploitation of natural resources will reinforce 
the ability of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to tackle the challenges relating to their 
development agenda, including those relating to fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals. This is 
particularly relevant in relation to structural change for equality and includes raising productivity with 
innovation, employment with rights and protecting strategic resources such as minerals, water and energy. 
 
 These reflections are put before member countries of UNASUR in the hope that they will 
stimulate discussions on the promise of South American integration, which is perceived as indispensable 
for overcoming the pressing problem of inequality in our region. 
 
 We present them in the conviction that change must be sought as a matter of urgency to promote 
well-being and conditions conducive to development in our region, bearing in mind the centrality of the 
sustainability and equality variables necessary for reflection and action. Each country will need to seek for 
itself equilibrium between State, market and society as a basis for a political and fiscal covenant. There is no 
single model or recipes but a more progressive and more distributive structure and tax burden will 




 In the long-term strategic horizon, equality, economic growth and environmental sustainability 
must go hand-in-hand and be mutually supportive and reinforcing in a virtuous dialectic.  
 
 Thus, we advocate valuing and harnessing more efficiently natural resource stocks in order to 
direct gains towards growth associated with less structural heterogeneity, more productive development 





 Alicia Bárcena 
 Executive Secretary 
 Economic Commission for 





NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS 
 
 
As part of the closer collaboration being pursued by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Secretary General of the 
Union requested ECLAC to produce the present report, entitled “Natural resources within the Union of 
South American Nations: status and trends for a regional development agenda”. 
 
 We commend ECLAC on its sterling work in collecting and compiling the extremely relevant 
information on the status of natural resources in South America, in particular with respect to 
hydrocarbons, mining and water resources. This document will be of great value for policymakers in their 
effort to exploit more fully this huge potential for the integrated development of the region. 
 
 Indeed, this report opens up a whole agenda of study and research, which will need to be 
deepened and expanded as we seek a common policy not only for confronting challenges but also for 
harnessing the region’s immense resource endowment. The success of a project of the scope of UNASUR 
depends on the ability to pool the strengths of its members, which, in this case, consist essentially in the 
extent of their natural resources and human potential. Moreover, historically this has been a peaceful 
region and its peoples are increasingly aware of the need for unity. 
 
 It should come as no surprise that this kind of process gives rise to diverse visions and 
approaches, but the idea is precisely to identify areas of greater convergence and to strive to forge a 
common strategy. 
 
 It should be noted that the views and proposals set forth in this document are the sole 
responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of UNASUR. A comprehensive 
process of discussion and debate must now be launched in all UNASUR forums in order to move forward 
with consensus-building and the formulation of common policies with a view to enhancing the 
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A. GOVERNANCE OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES SECTORS  
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  1 
 
 
The value of primary sector exports in Latin America and the Caribbean started to soar in 2003 because of 
the rise in international prices of metals, crude oil and other commodities, which peaked in 2007. The 
boom in the international demand for primary goods (minerals, hydrocarbons, soybean and agricultural 
commodities) largely explains the stronger macroeconomic performance and fiscal position of the 
region’s exporting countries from 2003 onwards.  
 
 During the global financial crisis that affected the economy between 2009 and 2010, Latin 
America and the Caribbean showed the benefits of having built up the capacity to deploy countercyclical 
policies to cushion the impact of the international crisis, by managing fiscal savings made during the price 
boom before 2008. There is extensive literature on macroeconomic management as the means of 
preventing the so-called Dutch disease, which is the negative impact that extraordinary revenue generated 
by the exploitation of natural resources has on exchange rates and the overall production apparatus. It 
focuses on the importance of institutionalizing the use of saving mechanisms, such as stabilization funds, 
investment funds, macrofiscal rules and reserves to mitigate the negative effects of exchange rate 
appreciation on the rest of the economy during boom periods, like the present, and build up sufficient 
funds to alleviate the impact during a slump in prices. 
 
 According to economic literature, in the long-term countries must turn non-renewable natural 
resources into sustainable assets (human capital, production infrastructure, among others) in order to 
maintain the national revenue and further the development process once the resource life cycle has ended. 
In the past, the countries of the region have found it difficult to transform natural resource export booms 
(in mining, hydrocarbons and agro-industry) into long-term economic development processes with stable 
growth that would significantly reduce poverty and increase per capita income.  
 
 The short- and medium-term challenge for the countries of the region is to generate and 
efficiently invest extraordinary revenue from the current price cycle in order to achieve their sustainable 
and inclusive development goals. This challenge must be underpinned by a firm political consensus that 
enables the States to effectively channel investments into human capital, innovation, technological 
development and production infrastructure, and other long-term investments, and withstand political 
pressure to use up extraordinary resources today. 
 
 Each country’s sovereign policy on the ownership, appropriation and distribution of natural 
resources is taken into account in the governance of natural resources in order to maximize its 
contribution to sustainable development. This undoubtedly involves many political challenges and 
requires sound public management. An area the region has yet to work on is reviewing and consolidating 
the institutional framework, regulatory frameworks and instruments used to maximize the natural 
resource sector’s contribution to regional development. This involves the management of government 
revenues derived from the exploitation of these resources, which the State receives through the tax 
system, and distribution among different stakeholders and levels of government; mechanisms 
                                                     
1  In this document, the concept “natural resources” refers to minerals, hydrocarbons and water resources. It does 
not include resources such as land or earth, forest resources, fishery resources, biodiversity or genetic assets. 
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must be created to ensure these revenues are invested efficiently in order to lay the foundations for 
sustainable development. 
 
 States have several means of contributing to the natural resources sector. They include:  
 
(i) specific legislation and regulation; 
(ii) planning and formulation of sectoral policies, special tax regimes, concessionary regimes 
and public-private partnerships for investment, and the development of natural resources; 
(iii) creating specific institutions for regulating, controlling and distributing government 
revenues generated by the exploitation of natural resources among the different levels of 
government; 
(iv) direct involvement of the State in the development of resources through public companies, 
partnerships and agreements;  
(v) public administration and socioenvironmental conflict resolution mechanisms in extractive 
sectors; 
(vi) creating public saving funds for investment in a particular purpose (for example, education, 
innovation and development) and macrofiscal stabilization funds for countercyclical 
macroeconomic management to deal with international price movements of exported 
natural resources, and 
(vii) policies designed to promote industrialization and reform production in the natural resources 
sector by creating links with the rest of the economy and incorporating technology. 
 
 The governance of the natural resources sector involves many challenges relating to regulatory or 
fiscal aspects, macroeconomic management, strategic planning, the formulation and implementation of 
public policies, socioenvironmental conflict management and other government functions which require 
institutional innovation and sound public administration in order to maximize the social benefit of 
exploiting these resources. 
 
 While advances have been made in recent years to ensure that States and subnational 
governments have a greater share of revenues derived from the exploitation of natural resources, there are 
still many challenges to overcome, such as achieving efficient organization and establishing the 
institutional framework needed to maximize the sector’s contribution to development.2 Some of the 
challenges include: 
 
(i) institutionalizing mechanisms for countercyclical macroeconomic management in the face 
of volatile international prices for commodities exported by the region; 
(ii) developing mechanisms which ensure that the revenue generated from the exploitation of 
natural resources is efficiently invested by the State in education, health, infrastructure, 
innovation and technological development and is fairly distributed between social groups 
and levels of government; 
(iii) achieving effective public management of socioenvironmental conflicts which will 
inevitably arise during development of the natural resources sector; 
(iv) increasing the State’s share in revenue from the exploitation of natural resources, particularly 
during price booms which are becoming more persistent, like the one at present, and 
  
                                                     
2  For example, by creating the Heritage and Stabilization Fund, Trinidad and Tobago became the only country to 
establish a long-term saving fund, financed by fiscal savings from the hydrocarbons sector. 
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(v) sustaining the rise in investments and increasing the State’s share in extraordinary revenues. 
To do this, it may be necessary to make changes to the tax policy applied in these sectors 
during periods of extraordinary earnings and improve the coordination and harmonization 
of fiscal treatment between countries receiving investments to avoid fiscal competition, 
which prevents these objectives from being achieved.  
 
 
B. THE BOOM IN INTERNATIONAL PRICES OF METALS, CRUDE OIL 
AND OTHER RAW MATERIAL BETWEEN 2003 AND 2011  
 
 
The current boom in international prices of metals, crude oil and other raw materials is partly due to the 
steady rise in the global demand for these goods, which is attributable to accelerated economic growth in 
Asian countries in the past decade. The increase in global demand stems from the remarkable economic 
growth in China since the 1990s, which was bolstered by the growth of India and other emerging 
economies that started in 2000.  
 
 The increase in the demand for iron, copper, aluminium and other export minerals is linked with 
the growth in the construction, infrastructure and manufacturing sectors (which need steel, electrical 
conductors and industrial metals, among others); these sectors showed rapid growth as the pace of 
economic development of Asia’s major economies increased. The rate of economic growth in these 
economies has also helped to boost the global demand for crude oil and other primary goods. 
 
 The economic outlook presented by several international organizations shows that Asia’s 
principal emerging economies will continue to expand in the medium-term. More moderate growth is 
expected in China while other countries, such as India and Indonesia, will maintain or increase their 
current rate of expansion.3 Given the inertia of economic development in Asia and other emerging 
regions, the global demand for primary goods is expected to grow and as a result, the current boom in 
international prices of metals, oil and other primary exports from the region should continue in the 
medium term. 
 
 The fact that the price of metals and crude oil has remained at record highs and has shown a rapid 
recovery after trending downwards during the subprime mortgage crisis (2008 and 2009) and the 
European debt crisis (2011) shows the persistence of the current price boom. The price of metals and 
crude oil in real terms between 2009 and 2011 was particularly favourable compared with the average 
price over the past 25 years (see figure 1). 
 
 From a State perspective, it is crucial to secure the Government’s share of increased economic 
rents from extractive sectors during the present price cycle4 without affecting the growth of investments 
in these sectors. This political dilemma is heightened by the fact that the boom in international prices for 
minerals is expected to continue over the next years. 
 
  
                                                     
3  See World Bank and International Monetary Fund economic projections. 
4  In most of the countries, the law states that any mineral resource extracted belongs to the State. 
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Figure 1 
INTERNATIONAL PRICE INDEX FOR RAW MATERIALS,  
JANUARY 2003-MAY 2011 


















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures provided by the 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
 
C. STATE SHARE IN REVENUE FROM EXTRACTIVE SECTORS 
 
 
Fiscal revenue from the exploitation of primary products (mining, hydrocarbons and agricultural exports) 
has increased in terms of GDP as against the period 1990-1992 and, particularly, the start of the 2000s 
(1999-2001) when low values were observed in all of the countries analysed (see figure 2). The 
performance of fiscal revenues is in keeping with the evolution of price indices for these products during 
the same period (ECLAC, 2012d).  
 
 The accelerated increase in international prices for commodities over the past years also 
prompted Governments to strengthen the tax system in order to attract more resources. For example, the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile and the Plurinational State of Bolivia created new marketing 
taxes on these products. In Argentina, devaluation of the national currency following the abolition of 
the currency-board regime meant that sectors exporting natural products received higher profits. 
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Figure 2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FISCAL REVENUE 
GENERATED BY COMMODITIES, 1990-1992, 1999-2001 AND 2007-2011 a 


















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.  
a  Figures for 2011 are estimates. Data for Chile does not include tax from private mines. 
 
 
 In the countries that have large endowments of non-renewable resources (gas, oil and minerals), 
the most direct way in which Governments have tapped into commodity export earnings and turned them 
into fiscal resources has been by taking a share of operating earnings, either through public enterprises or 
through equity holdings. Governments have several mechanisms for obtaining revenue, including 
royalties, usually production-based, which have made it possible to ensure a minimum payment for 
resources. Most countries have also applied the traditional income tax with differential rates, levied on 
enterprises engaged in the exploitation of non-renewable resources (ECLAC, 2012d) (see table 1). 
 
During price booms, the State’s share in extraordinary revenue generated by commodity exports 
is proportionately higher. And so, since the recent commodity price cycle has been long, there has 
been growing political interest with respect to the State’s share in revenues from sectors exporting 
these goods.5 
 
 The aim of this document is to examine recent trends in the mining, hydrocarbons and water 
resources sectors as part of the wider agenda on natural resources governance. 
                                                     
5  Given that it is difficult to operationalize the concept “extraordinary revenue”, it is understood as cumulative 
earnings from surges in international prices, which are significantly higher than the rate of return that the 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (10 COUNTRIES): CHARACTERISTICS 
OF TAX REGIMES APPLIED TO NON-RENEWABLE PRODUCTS 
Country and 
product Royalties (rates) 
Income tax  
(general rate) 
Other taxes on 




(oil and mining) 
12%-15%; or 5% for 
marginal deposits (oil) 
0%-3% (mining) 
Profits tax: 35%   Export duties (25%-
45%, 100% for 
hydrocarbons and 5%-
10% for mining) 
Taxes on liquid fuels, 
natural gas, gas oil, 
liquefied gas, naphthas 










royalties: 11%  
National compensatory 
royalties: 1%  
National royalties 
(national treasury): 6% 
Business profits tax: 
25% 




Direct tax on 
hydrocarbons: 32%  
 







10% of the value 
of production (can 
be reduced to 5%, 
depending on 
geological risk and 
other factors) 
Income tax is 15%,  
plus a surcharge of  
10% if profits are above 






15% (or 25% for 
payments to tax 
havens) 
Social levy on net profit: 
9% 
Contribution for 
intervention in the 





  First category tax on 
profits: 20% 
Tax on profit 
remittances 35% and 
tax on interest 
remittances 4%  
Special 40% profits 
tax (for public 
enterprises) 
 
Specific tax on operating 
income from mining 
activity: progressive 
rates between 0.5% and 
14%  
Tax with revenue 
earmarked for the 
Armed Forces (Reserved 
Law): 10% of foreign 
currency earnings from 





(oil and mining) 
8%-25% (oil) 
1%-12% (mining) 
Company tax: 25% 
Income tax for equity: 
9% for 2013-2015, 8% 
thereafter 
  Oil pipeline transport tax 
National gasoline tax 
and regular grade diesel 
fuel duties 








(of gross crude oil 
production) 
Income tax: 23% The State retains 
25% of gross income 
from the contract 
areab 
Labour share: the State 
receives 12% 








Table 1 (concluded) 
 
Country and 
product Royalties (rates) 
Income tax  
(general rate) 
Other taxes on 




(oil and mining) 
  Oil revenue tax 
(PEMEX): 30% 
Income tax (certain 
subsidiary companies): 
30% 





Special tax on 










Income tax: 30% Dividends and profit
distribution: 4.1% 
Special mining tax:  
2% - 8.4% 
and special mining levy: 





10% on onshore 
sales and 12.5% 
on offshore 
Profit tax: 50% of
profits obtained 
from oil production 
Additional tax on 
crude oil sales (the 
rate varies with the 
oil price) 
Green fund tax: 0.1% 
of gross income 
Additional tax on oil 
production  
Unemployment tax: 5% 






Republic of) (oil) 
30% of the value 
extracted 
Oil income tax: 50% Tax on extraordinary 
prices 
Extraction duty 
Export record tax 
PDVSA
(hydrocarbons) 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the 
respective countries. 
a The 25% additional tax on extraordinary profits (Surtax) was repealed by the Hydrocarbons Act (Law No. 3058) and replaced 
by YPFB participation in the new operating contracts. 
b Following amendment of the Hydrocarbons Act, the oil contracts are being renegotiated and a clause stipulates that the State 
receives 100% of any increase in the oil price, so the tax on extraordinary earnings no longer applies. 
 
 
 Chapters I and II look at the trends observed in the mining and hydrocarbons sectors, 
respectively. Both chapters outline the main stylized facts on reserves, production, consumption and 
indicators of trends. In a number of UNASUR mining countries (Chile, Colombia, Peru and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia), the State’s share in the economic rent from these sectors during the most 
recent price boom (2004-2010) is compared with the previous boom period (1990-2003). The results for 
non-members of UNASUR, such as Mexico, and other mineral-exporting countries located in Central 
America and the Caribbean are also shown in the tables in chapter I for purposes of comparison. Chapter 
III analyses the evolution of the water resources sector, particularly the development of hydroelectricity in 
the region. The concluding chapter, chapter IV, compares the performance of the mining and hydrocarbon 
sectors during the price boom of 2004-2010 and identifies some of the legal implications for the future. It 












A. THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF UNASUR COUNTRIES 
IN GLOBAL MINERAL OUTPUT 
 
 
Thirteen countries in Latin America are among the 15 largest producers in the world. In terms of the 
UNASUR countries, Chile has been the largest producer of copper since 1982 when it pushed the United 
States back into second place after many years at the top spot. Brazil was the leading producer of iron until 
2006 and is currently among the top three producers in the world after China and Australia. Peru is one of 
the foremost producers of silver, copper, gold and lead in the world. The Plurinational State of Bolivia is 
the fourth largest producer of tin ore and the sixth largest of silver —it also ranks strongly for other 
minerals. Lastly, Colombia ranks seventh among producers of refined nickel. Outside the UNASUR group, 
Cuba is the eighth largest producer of nickel ore in the world; Jamaica is the seventh largest producer of 
bauxite and Mexico is the largest producer of silver and the fifth of molybdenum and lead ore. 
 
 Between 1990 and 2010, Latin America and the Caribbean (UNASUR, Mexico, Central America 
and the Caribbean) saw its share of global output of gold (up from 10.3% to 19.2%), molybdenum ore (up 
from 15.8% to 31.8%) and copper ore (up from 24.9% to 45.4%) almost double The region’s output of 
refined copper also increased, but to a lesser extent (from 15.7% to 21.9%). Because the region’s share of 
global output is so great, the value of minerals on the principal international stock markets is affected if 
interruptions to operations at any major Latin American companies are expected or if a problem occurs 
such as a strike or an accident. 
 
 
B. EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRICE OF METALS 
AND MINERAL EXPORTS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL1 
 
 
Exports from the mining sector in Latin America and the Caribbean started to burgeon in 2002 because of 
the rise in the international price of metals in real terms, which reached record highs in 2007 
(see figure I.1). Although some metal prices were adjusted downward during the global financial crisis of 
2008-2009, the value in real terms between 2009 and 2011 was particularly favourable in comparison 
with the average over the past 30 years. It should be noted that the prices of these products in real terms 
had declined between 1980 and 2001. 
 
 
                                                     
1  The figures in the following sections show Latin America and the Caribbean’s global position in the mining 
sector compared with other regions in the world. The text refers specifically to the results of those mining 
countries that belong to UNASUR and which are analysed as part of this study (Chile, Colombia, Peru and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia). 
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Table I.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SHARE OF THE TOTAL GLOBAL 
MINING OUTPUT, 1990-2012 
Mineral or metal 
Percentages of world total Production in 2011 
(thousands of tons, 
except gold and silver, 
which are in tons) 
Top three  
producers in the  
region in 2012 b 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 a 
Bauxite 22.9 26.7 26.0 27.5 21.5 20.1 51 392.9 Brazil, Jamaica and 
Suriname 
Primary aluminium 9.2 10.4 8.9 7.5 5.5 6.1 2 186.9 Brazil, Argentina and 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of ) 
Copper ore 24.9 32.2 43.0 46.5 45.2 44.4 7 293.5 Chile, Peru and Mexico 
Refined copper 15.7 23.2 25.1 23.7 21.5 19.6 4 134.5 Chile, Mexico and Peru 
Gold 10.3 12.5 14.4 18.1 19.2 21.4 541.1 Peru, Mexico and Colombia
Silver 34.2 38.3 38.5 41.8 48.7 49.3 10 512.0 Peru, Mexico and Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of) 
Tin ore 28.3 27.8 26.0 21.2 19.5 20.4 57.6 Peru, Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) and Brazil 
Refined tin 23.1 15.8 14.9 18.0 16.6 13.9 52.1 Peru, Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) and Brazil 
Iron 22.6 24.9 26.1 26.0 23.1 n.a. 341.2 Brazil, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of) 
and Mexico 
Molybdenum ore 15.8 18.2 35.2 37.3 31.8 23.5 70.9 Chile, Peru and Mexico 
Nickel ore 11.5 11.7 14.1 15.1 12.9 13.4 196.5 Brazil, Cuba and Colombia 
Refined nickel 9.7 10.1 10.7 13.4 11.6 9.9 139.3 Brazil, Colombia and Cuba 
Lead ore 13.3 15.5 14.7 14.6 14.5 11.0 595.1 Mexico, Peru and Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of) 
Refined lead 7.8 7.6 8.4 7.2 7.4 4.1 484.3 Mexico, Brazil and 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 
Zinc ore 16.8 20.6 19.0 21.0 21.7 19.8 2 607.0 Peru, Mexico and Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of) 
Refined zinc 7.5 8.5 7.3 7.9 7.0 7.7 969.4 Mexico, Peru and Brazil 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Acquatella and J. Lardé, 
“Panorama regional del sector minero en América Latina y el Caribe”, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2012, unpublished; 
World Bureau of Metal Statistics, database; Gold Fields Mineral Services; and United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD).  
a  The 2012 data cover up to June or July, depending on the metal.  
b  The data on iron correspond to 2009.  
 
 The current boom in international metal prices is largely due to the steady rise in the global 
demand for primary goods, which is the result of economic growth that has been taking place in China 
and other Asian countries since the 1990s, particularly over the past 10 years when consumption of metals 
—aluminium, copper, nickel, lead and zinc— rose by more than 30% each year. The increase in the 
demand for metals such as iron, copper and aluminium is linked with the growth of construction, 
infrastructure and manufacturing sectors (which need steel, electrical conductors and industrial metals, 
among others); these sectors have grown rapidly as the process of economic development in emerging 




INTERNATIONAL PRICES OF COPPER, LEAD AND ZINC, 1965-2012 a 


















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Chilean Copper 
Commission (COCHILCO) and FRED Economic Data. 
a  The year 2012 covers January to September. 
 
 
 The share of mineral exports in total exports from the region has been rising since 2002 (see 
figure I.2). However, this is the case not only in Latin America and the Caribbean but also in other 
countries which have reacted in the same way to the high price of minerals and the huge profits generated 
from exploitation. 
 
 This pattern of growth of mineral exports and other primary goods has been described as 
“reprimarizing”, because it reduces the share of other goods, such as high-technology manufactures, in 
total exports. However, when the region’s share of mineral exports is compared with the global trend, 
there are few differences; the cycles, however, are more marked in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
What is more, the weight of minerals in the region’s export basket (7.1%) is still higher than the world 
average (3.3%) (compare the black continuous line with the black broken link in figure I.2). 
 
 Figure I.2 shows that Latin America and the Caribbean’s share in global mineral exports was on a 
downward trajectory between 1964 and 1992. However, it started to trend upwards in the 1990s and 
reached 12.8% of the world total in 2000. Since then, the trajectory has had ups and downs, but in 2010 
and 2011 it hit record highs. The region’s average share in global mineral exports was 11.8% of the world 
















LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND THE WORLD: SHARE OF MINERALS a 


















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
a  This includes those corresponding to divisions 27 (crude fertilizers and crude minerals), 28 (metalliferous ores and metal 
scraps) and 68 (non-ferrous metals) of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 3. 
 
 
 The value of world mineral exports grew significantly in the 2000s, not only in the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, but also in developed countries rich in mineral resources such as 
Australia, Canada and the United States. This can be observed in figures I.3 and I.4 which show that the 
value of exports of minerals in the primary stage of processing and exports of higher value added 
minerals in the manufacturing stage increased considerably.2 
 
 Although the output of manufactured minerals has increased since 2003, exports of minerals in 
the primary stages of processing have in fact shown the highest growth, primarily in Australia and next in 
Latin America. Indeed, Latin America’s main exports are of metalliferous ores and metal scraps (division 
28 of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 3) and non-ferrous metal-based 
manufactures (division 68) and iron- and steel-based manufactures (division 67). Since 2000, the 
strongest growth has been among metalliferous ores and metal scraps (division 28) which grew at an 
average annual rate of 64%, non-ferrous metals (division 68) at 27% and crude fertilizers (division 27) at 
15% (see figure I.5).  
 
  
                                                     
2  The volume of mineral exports from Germany and the progress made in this respect are worth considering and 
although the country is not rich in mineral resources, it is the second largest exporter of mineral products. 
According to Sánchez-Albavera and Lardé (2006), the general rule in developing countries was that the 
production of ore does not necessarily mean that the country had a high smelting and refining capacity. As the 
level of processing advances, the installed capacity was concentrated mainly in developed countries, and so, for 
example, countries which do not produce ore, such as Germany and Japan, are among the most important 
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World mineral exports/total world exports
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Figure I.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND MAJOR MINERAL EXPORTERS: EXPORTS 
OF MINERALS IN THE PRIMARY STAGE OF PROCESSING, 1962-2010 a 

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
a  This includes those corresponding to divisions 27 (crude fertilizers and minerals) and 28 (metalliferous ores and metal scraps) 
of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 3. 
 
Figure I.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND MAJOR MINERAL EXPORTERS: EVOLUTION 
OF EXPORTS OF MINERALS IN THE MANUFACTURING STAGE, 1962-2010 a 

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
a  This includes minerals in the manufacturing stage corresponding to divisions 66 (non-metallic mineral manufactures), 
67 (iron and steel), 68 (non-ferrous metals) and 69 (manufactures of metals) of the Standard International Trade 
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Figure I.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF EXPORTS OF PRIMARY MINERALS 
AND MINERAL MANUFACTURES,a 1962-2010 

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 




 Exports of metals, primary minerals and higher value added minerals in the manufacturing stage 
have expanded in Latin America as well as in the developed countries examined (Germany, Australia and 
the United States).  
 
 
C. INVESTMENT IN MINERAL PROSPECTING 
 
 
Investments in mineral prospecting have been increasing worldwide since 2003. The global prospecting 
budget for non-ferrous metals rose from US$ 2.194 million in 2003 to US$ 11.2 billion in 2010 
(see figure I.6). However, this upward trend was interrupted in 2009 by the recession triggered by the 
subprime mortgage crisis during the last quarter of 2007 in the United States, but later picked up again. 
 
 The region of Latin America and the Caribbean has been the main destination for investment in 
world mineral prospecting since 1994. The budget for exploration in the region increased more than five-
fold from US$ 566 million in 2003 to US$ 3.024 million per year in 2010. More than half of the budget is 
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Non-metallic mineral manufactures (66) Iron and steel (67)
Non-ferrous metals (68) Manufactures of metals (69)
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Figure I.6 
DISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL MINERAL PROSPECTING BUDGET 2003 AND 2010 















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the Centre for Copper and 
Mining Studies (CESCO) and Metals Economics Group, World Exploration Trends. 
 
Figure I.7 
LATIN AMERICA: GLOBAL MINERAL PROSPECTING BUDGET, BY REGION 
AND WORLD TOTAL, 2003-2010 

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the Centre for Copper and 
Mining Studies (CESCO) and J. Acquatella and J. Lardé, “Panorama regional del sector minero en América Latina y el 
Caribe”, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2012, unpublished.  
 
 
 At the start of the 1990s, mineral exploration expenditure for countries such as Australia, Canada 
and the United States was diverted to Latin America because depleted stocks in some mining areas, the 
removal of tax incentives and tighter environmental regulations meant that exploration was more 
expensive in these countries. In addition to these factors, liberalization triggered a sudden rise in Latin 
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exploration for twenty years. Exploration took place primarily in Peru, Mexico, Brazil and Chile and to a 
lesser extent, in Argentina. The first four countries are among the top ten destinations for world mineral 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAJOR DESTINATIONS 
FOR MINERAL EXPLORATION, 2010 

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the Centre for Copper and 
Mining Studies (CESCO), databases; and Metals Economics Group. 
 
 
D. UNASUR COUNTRIES ACCOUNT FOR AN INCREASING PROPORTION 
OF WORLD MINERAL RESERVES 
 
 
The rise in exploration activities in Latin America and the Caribbean has led to an increase in proven 
reserves of a large number of minerals. For example, gold reserves in the region, which stood at 200 tons 
in 2000 and were primarily located in Peru, increased to 9,200 tons in 2010 distributed between Chile, 
Brazil, Peru and Mexico. Several UNASUR countries hold a major share of the largest mineral reserves 
on the planet –in particular, they control at least 65% of global lithium reserves (Chile, Argentina and 
Brazil), 49% of silver reserves (Peru, Chile, the Plurinational State of Bolivia along with Mexico (a non-
member of UNASUR), 44% of copper reserves (Chile and Peru, and to a lesser extent, Mexico), 33% of 
tin reserves (Peru, Brazil and the Plurinational State of Bolivia), 26% of bauxite reserves (Brazil, Guyana, 
Suriname, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (and Jamaica, another non-member), 23% of nickel 
reserves (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia(along with other non-members: Cuba 
and the Dominican Republic), and 22% of iron (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Brazil and Mexico). 
The mineral potential is estimated to be even higher since the geological information available is limited3 
(see figure I.9). 
                                                     
3  Reserves refer to identified resources or mining assets. The economic feasibility of exploiting these reserves 
depends on a number of factors such as costs and prices, the technology available and the physical characteristics 


























LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN MINERAL RESERVES, 2000 AND 2010 

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the United States 
Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2011.  
Note:  The countries with reserves in 2010 are listed above the columns for that year by order of magnitude of their reserves . 
 
 
E. FORECASTS FOR MINERAL INVESTMENT SHOW VIGOROUS GROWTH 
 
 
The decade of the 1990s in Latin America and the Caribbean was a period known for the political and 
regulatory reforms introduced to attract private investment. As part of reforms for the mining sector, tax 
incentives and favourable legal frameworks, which in some countries included long-term tax stability 
contracts, were created. They also set the ground rules for competitive investment in the sector and 
created better conditions than those in other mining regions in the world.4 
 
 At present, Latin America is the primary destination of the world mining investment portfolio. 
According to the Engineering & Mining Journal’s annual survey, the projects for the region stood at US$ 
180 billion in 2010, which accounts for almost one third of world mining investment. This survey of 
planned (not implemented) projects is an indicator of how attractive the incentives offered by the 
countries are and what the return on these investments is expected to be. Figure I.10 compares the project 
portfolio for the region in 2000, which was only US$ 25 billion, with the portfolio for 2010. 
 
  
                                                     
4  According to a comparative study covering 24 mining countries, Chile and Argentina are among the 20% with 
the lowest effective tax rates and highest private profitability, while the Plurinational State of Bolivia is among 
the upper 33%. Mexico and Peru are closer to the international average, ranking 13th and 17th out of the 24 




















































































































































MINING INVESTMENT PROJECT PORTFOLIO, BY REGION, 2000 AND 2010 















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Engineering & 
Mining Journal survey. 
 
 In 2011, Brazil, Chile and Peru were among the top ten destinations for mining investments. 
Figure I.11 shows that 10 years ago, only Chile and Peru were in that group. The metals that attracted the 
highest investments were iron (27%), copper (27%), gold (16%), nickel ore (14%) and refined nickel 
(3%), which together account for 87% of the total project portfolio.  
 
Figure I.11 
DISTRIBUTION OF MINING INVESTMENTS AMONG THE TOP TEN 
RECEIVING COUNTRIES, 2000 AND 2010 
















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data published in the 













































































F. STATE SHARE IN ECONOMIC RENT FROM THE MINING SECTOR 
DURING THE MOST RECENT PRICE CYCLE 
 
 
The economic rent5 of the mining sector (World Bank, 2011)6 increased from 0.54% of GDP in Latin 
America and the Caribbean between 1990 and 2003 to 2.08% between 2004 and 2009 —almost four 
times greater.7 Economic rent received from the sector is used (i) for taxes, royalties and other duties to 
the State; (ii) as private profits for extraction companies, and (iii) for other production-related activities 
carried out after extraction, primarily to pay wages for extraction company employees.8  
 
 Table I.2 shows the changes in mining output and economic rent from the sector as a percentage of 
GDP in selected UNASUR ore-exporting countries (Chile, Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia) and other producers in the region. It compares data observed during the price boom between 2004 
and 2009 with data for the period 1990-2003. Revenue from the mining sector not only increased almost 
four-fold between these two periods for the region as a whole, but also doubled in almost all of the countries 
listed (see the figures in bold). The penultimate column shows the mining sector’s fiscal contribution in the 
form of tax payments, royalties and other duties as a percentage of the sector’s revenue and the last column 
shows the percentage of total fiscal revenue. The following stylized facts were observed: 
 
(i) The mining sector’s average fiscal contribution as a percentage of total fiscal revenue 
increased in all of the countries studied between 2004 and 2009 compared with the previous 
period. The Plurinational State of Bolivia’s contribution was three times greater (up from 
1% to 3.7% of total fiscal revenue) and contributions were four times greater in Chile and 
Peru (up from 8.2% to 37.5% in Chile and 2.9% to 14.2% in Peru). 
 
(ii) Despite the significant increase in their contribution to fiscal revenue between 2004 and 
2009, the State share in the total economic rent generated by the mining sector did not 
exceed 35% in countries with a long mining tradition in the region (such as Chile, Peru and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia) and was even below 15% in some countries with low 
mining activity. 
                                                     
5  The “pure” economic rent of the mineral resource is the difference between the value of the output in 
international prices and the cost of production of the ore at the pithead. To calculate the economic rent, the cost 
of production is the cost of extracting the ore as far as the pithead, which includes the opportunity cost of capital 
invested in the extraction operation. The per unit economic rent of each mineral exported may be estimated by 
subtracting the average cost of production at the pithead per ton of mineral exported from the international price. 
An estimate of the total economic rent of the mining sector is calculated by adding the per unit rents for the 
whole production process and the types of ore exported. There are some minerals, such as copper, which are 
traded almost exclusively as concentrates and the concentration process is carried out at the pithead. In such 
cases, the economic rent of the concentrate is calculated and the cost of production must therefore include the 
cost of the concentration process. 
6  The mining revenue (in percentages of GDP) is the value of the mining and quarry sector output (metal mining) 
at the international price minus the relevant production costs (cost of extraction at the pithead and opportunity 
cost of the capital invested in the extraction process) for a basket of 10 minerals (tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, 
copper, nickel, silver, bauxite and phosphate).  
7  Estimate based on mining revenue statistics (as a percentage of GDP) published by the World Bank (2011) for 
the different countries. Table I.2 shows these indicators for each country and the region as a whole between 1990 
and 2003 and 2004 and 2009 (the most recent five-year period for which data are available).  
8  Strictly speaking, private profitability is the economic rent available after taxes and other fiscal duties have been 
paid in each country and after other post-pithead production-related activities have been paid (wages and selling 
costs, for example, transporting the mineral, crude oil or gas to shipping ports). 
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(iii) In Chile and Peru, the main mining countries that belong to UNASUR, and Colombia and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the State’s direct share and fiscal revenue represents 
between 30% and 35% of the estimated economic rent from the sector. This is similar to the 
percentage received by the State in mining countries which are members of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, Australia (26%) and 
Canada (38%), and almost the benchmark rate of 33%, estimated using data on fiscal 
payments made by 10 major transnational mining companies between 2005 and 2010.9 
 
(iv) By way of contrast, the State share in the estimated economic rent from the hydrocarbons 
sector was between 45% and 65% in the region’s exporting countries. This trend is also 
observed at the international level and shows that the State’s direct share in output, through 
pubic oil companies and joint ventures, was higher, as was the role of oil taxation systems 
in designing fiscal mechanisms and contractual agreements to boost the State’s share.10 
 
(v) In the case of Chile, fiscal contributions made by the State company CODELCO (22.1%) 
were key to achieving the State share of 35.7% in the sector’s estimated economic rent 
between 2004 and 2009. 
 
(vi) The fiscal contribution made by private mining companies in Chile (GMP-10, table I.2 
shows the top 10 private mining companies) is almost half of the contribution made by the 
State company, CODELCO, and less than a third (11.1%) of the State share (35.7%) in the 
economic rent from the sector. 
 
(vii) The fiscal contribution made by CODELCO is much more significant than that of private 
mining companies, since it produces only one third (31.2%) of the country’s copper,11 while 
private companies account for the rest. In other words, the one third share of copper 
production held by CODELCO contributes almost two thirds of the State’s share in the 
economic rent from the sector. 
 
(viii) Before 2004, in all the countries analysed, with the exception of Colombia, the State’s share 
in economic rent from the mining sector averaged less than 25%. 
 
                                                     
9  The aggregate data of tax payments made by 10 major transnational mining companies were provided by the 
auditing firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011). 
10  The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) publishes the payments received by Governments and 
those made by extractive industries (mining, oil, gas) in the member countries which have voluntarily joined the 
organization. A review of data published by EITI for 29 member countries (19 in Africa, 4 in Asia and the rest in 
Europe, the Middle East and Oceania and Peru —the only EITI member representing Latin America and the 
Caribbean) proves that, overall, the States receive a higher percentage of the total economic rent from the 
hydrocarbons sector than from that of the mining sector. 
11  CODELCO produces 31.2% of fine copper in Chile. See table 2.2 in COCHILCO (2011). 
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Table I.2 
INDICATORS AND FISCAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE MINING SECTOR 





as a percentage 
of GDP 
Mining rent 
as a percentage 
of GDP a 
Fiscal revenue 
from mining b 
as a percentage 
of mining rent 
 Fiscal revenue from 
mining as a percentage 
of total fiscal revenue 
1990-2003 2004-2009 1990-2003 2004-2009 Before 2004 c 2004-2009
 d  Before 
2004 2004-2009
Argentina 1.80 1.54 0.05 0.48      
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  3.96 5.73 0.30 2.28  57.7    2.2  
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  
not including duties to COMIBOL      34.6 e   1.3  
Brazil f 0.52 0.66 0.64 2.24      





(copper) 6.47 17.29 21.8  35.7   8.2  37.5 
Chile (CODELCO with dividends)     17.8  22.1  6.7  23.2 
Chile (only private mines, GMP-10) g     4.0 13.6  1.5  14.3  
Colombia f 1.73 2.42 0.17 0.91 36.9 h 37.1 h  1.9 2.1 
Ecuador f 6.96 14.71 0.01 0.03      
Guatemala i 0.85 1.44 n.a. 0.24 j n.a. 12.2  n.a. 0.3 k 
Guyana i 16.22 11.28 5.62 5.34      
Honduras 0.47 0.86 0.25 0.69 10.2  10 l  0.05  0.5  
Jamaica m 4.99 2.8 3.43 1.67      
Mexico 0.80 1.02 0.14 0.34      
Nicaragua m 0.74 1.19 0.07 0.63      
Panama n 0.49 1.14 n.a. n.a.      
Peru 4.02 8.5 0.79 7.16 n.a. 27.4  2.9  14.2  
Dominican Republic 0.75 0.41 0.69 1.96      
Suriname m 6.17 12.92 7.26 5.07      
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1.97 2.11 0.32 0.83        
Latin America n.a. n.a. 0.54 2.08        
Australia m 4.85 7.53 1.17 4.12 o 18 p 26.1 q    
Canada m 4.7 6.8 0.2 0.69  38.6    
United States m 1.2 1.8 0.0 0.08      
South Africa m 7.3 8.1 0.9 2.47        
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE), World Bank and official data and official figures.  
a  Mining rent (as a percentage of GDP): World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI). 
b  Includes income tax and royalties.  
c  The figures for Chile correspond to the period 1994-2003. The figures for Honduras correspond to the period 2001-2003.  
d  The figures for Guatemala correspond to the period 2004-2009. 
e  Corresponds to the period 2000-2009 and includes royalties, profit tax and tax on remittances from mining companies to the State. 
Does not include duties to the Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL). 
f  Mining production as a percentage of GDP corresponds to the period 2004-2006 in Colombia and 2004-2007 in Ecuador. 
g  Includes duties and special taxes or royalties from major private copper mines (GMP-10). 
h  Corresponds to the periods 2000-2003 and 2004-2006. Includes taxes and royalties paid by mining companies. 
i  The figures referring to GDP in the mining sector include mining, oil and natural gas.   
j  Corresponds to the period 2006-2009. 
k  Corresponds to the period 2006-2010. The data corresponds only to the Marlin gold mine, the most important in the country, which 
accounted for 95.5% of mining exports from Guatemala in 2008. 
l  Estimate based on 10% of the data on mining rent published by the World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI). 
m  The figures referring to GDP in the mining sector include mining and oil.  
n  The data on the mining sector’s share in GDP corresponds to the period 2004-2008. 
o  Includes metal and non-metal mining, oil and natural gas extraction and coal mining, on the basis of World Bank and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS), in Hogan and McCallum (2010). 
p  Approximate value for 1993-2003, on the basis of Hogan and McCallum (2010); only metal mining.  
q  Approximate value for 2004-2007, on the basis of Hogan and McCallum (2010); only metal mining.  
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 In terms of the UNASUR countries, the State’s share in mining revenue in percentages was 
estimated for Chile, Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia on the basis of disaggregated 




STATE SHARE IN THE MINING SECTOR’S ESTIMATED ECONOMIC RENT AND THE TOTAL 
FISCAL REVENUE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1990-2003 AND 2004-2009 
(Percentages) 
Country 
State share in the economic rent 
from the mining sector  
(yearly average, by period) 
Mining sector’s fiscal contribution 
to the total fiscal revenue  
(yearly average, by period) 
Before 2004 2004-2009 Complete period Before 2004 2004-2009 
Complete 
period 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (ECLAC data) (*) 39.8  1.0 3.7 3.1 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (PIEB data)   57.7   2.2 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  
(not including duties to COMIBOL, PIEB data)   34.6   1.3 
Chile (copper, GMP-10 and CODELCO) 21.8 35.7 32.1 8.2 37.5 23.0 
Chile (CODELCO, includes dividends) 17.9 22.1 21.0 6.7 23.2 15.0 
Chile (only GMP-10 private mines 
and special tax or royalty) 3.9 13.6 11.1 1.5 14.3 8.0 
Colombia 36.9 37.1  1.9   
Guatemala  12.2   0.4  
Honduras 10.2 10.0 10.1 0.05 0.5 0.4 
Peru (*) 27.4 30.0 2.9 14.2 10.1 
Australia (metal mining) 17.9 26.1 20.2    
Canada    38.6    
Gross income tax paid at the international level by the 
10 largest transnational mining companies 33.6 33.2    
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) and World Bank. Calculated as the average of the annual share 
percentages (using nominal prices). PIEB data on the Plurinational State of Bolivia was taken from the study by Jordán 
and others (2010).  
Note: COMIBOL: Bolivian Mining Corporation; CODELCO: National Copper Corporation of Chile; GMP-10: Major 
commercial mines. 





THE HYDROCARBON SECTOR IN THE UNASUR COUNTRIES:  
TRENDS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 
A. OIL AND NATURAL GAS: EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 
 
 
The oil and natural gas production sector is organized in a variety of ways in the region. In the 1990s, 
countries such as Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia promoted private-sector participation in exploration and production activities and reforms to 
transport, refining and distribution systems. During the last decade, these countries have moved towards 
greater State control of the hydrocarbon sector, something that has included price controls, renegotiation 
of contracts, nationalization of assets and a stronger role for the State enterprise in the organization of the 
sector, among other aspects. 
 
 Since 1993, 1997 and 2004, respectively, Peru, Brazil and Colombia have operated a policy of 
price liberalization and encouragement of competition and foreign direct investment in the hydrocarbon 
sector, regulated by a national supervisory authority. Bidding and allocation rounds for exploration areas 
have been open to both State oil firms (such as Petrobras of Brazil and Ecopetrol of Colombia) and 
private-sector firms. 
 
 By and large, countries with an exporting tradition or favourable geological prospects under 
conditions of high prices —like those that have prevailed since 2003— have tended towards greater State 
control. Conversely, importing countries with a need to develop their industry and attract investment have 
inclined towards liberalization of the sector. 
 
 In practice, both the countries that control resources and reserves and the oil firms that possess 
the technology and capital, far from acting unilaterally, interact in a global market that is unquestionably 
proving to be uncertain, dynamic and competitive. In this international context, and in the face of 
unremitting price volatility, Governments are trying to reconcile a variety of objectives that range from 
maximizing their appropriation of oil revenues to attracting investment for the sector’s development, 
supplying the domestic market and producing hydrocarbons efficiently, among other policy goals. The 
region’s position in the global context as regards cumulative reserves, production, consumption, trade and 
tax regimes for hydrocarbons will now be examined. 
 
 
B. RESERVES, PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND TREND INDICATORS 
 
 
1. SOUTH AMERICA IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
 
 
In 2011, South America had the second-largest oil reserves of any region (after the Middle East), with a 
share of 20%. The growth of oil and natural gas stocks since 2008 has been due to the certification of 
reserves in the Orinoco Belt by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as part of the Magna project, and to 
successful exploration, mainly in Brazil and Colombia (see figure II.1).   
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Figure II.1 
SOUTH AMERICA: SHARES OF THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS SECTORS, 
















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP p.l.c., “Statistical Review of 
World Energy”, 2011 and 2012 [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
 
 
 The region’s gas reserves have declined as a share of the world total in the last five years, to 3%. 
Growth has been strongest in regions such as North America, Central Asia and the Middle East. Among 
individual countries, the United States (with its proven reserves of unconventional gas), Turkmenistan 
and Qatar have seen the largest increases. 
 
 The region’s and the world’s output of all hydrocarbons has been increasing in recent years. 
South America has lost ground as an oil producer, however, to regions such as North America, Eastern 
Europe, Central Asia and Africa, where greater development activity has boosted production from 
deposits of tar sands in Canada and others such as those of Kashagan in Kazakhstan, Sakhalin in the 
Russian Federation and Girassol and Mondo I in Angola. 
 
 The rise in international prices since 2003 has had a substantial influence on the supply of and 
demand for hydrocarbons in the UNASUR countries. In the first case, higher prices have driven oil 
exploration, drilling and enhanced recovery, thus increasing supply (albeit to a limited extent) in 
response to the growth in demand.1 In the second case, demand has responded only slowly to rising 
prices, and this may be related to the levels of fuel subsidies maintained in some of the region’s 
countries. Since 2004, regional consumption growth (averaging 5% a year) and its correlation with 
GDP growth have been greater than the average annual increase in hydrocarbon production (3%) (see 
figures II.2 and II.3). 
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Figure II.2 
SOUTH AMERICA AND THE WORLD: OIL AND NATURAL GAS RESERVES, PRODUCTION 
AND CONSUMPTION VERSUS ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PRICES 

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, “World Development 
Indicators (WDI)” [online] http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do; BP p.l.c., “Statistical Review of World Energy”, 
2011 and 2012 [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview; and ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America and the 
Caribbean 2012 (LC/G.2546-P), Santiago, Chile, 2012. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.12.II.G.3. 
a  Reserves are expressed in trillions of barrels of oil equivalent; production and consumption are expressed in millions of 
barrels of oil equivalent per day. 
 
 
 The trend towards lower growth in the supply of oil relative to demand in the region may create 
energy supply and security problems and lead to a decline in the volume available for export in future. It 
could also increase the risk of trade deficits, greater domestic and external borrowing and a reduction in 
net international reserves in countries whose fiscal spending is closely tied to hydrocarbon revenues. 
 
 Reserves, production and consumption have grown for natural gas as well as oil. The unit used in 
this case is the barrel of oil equivalent, with an average worldwide conversion factor for natural gas, 
calculated by BP p.l.c., of 5,610 cubic feet per barrel equivalent. The nominal West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI) price has been deflated by the United States Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-
U) with base 2000=100. The GDP growth figures given for South America are those of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
 
 Both investment costs and operating and maintenance costs display a clear upward trend since 
2004 (see figure II.3). The rise has not been offset by price increases to the same extent as in the mining 
sector, where these have far outstripped growth in mineral exploitation and processing costs.2 
 
  
                                                     
2  Consequently, the increase in economic rent between the pre-2003 period and the 2004-2010 period was 
proportionally smaller in the hydrocarbon sector than in the mining sector. In absolute terms, however, regionwide 
revenues remained substantially higher in the hydrocarbon sector (averaging US$264.032 billion in 2005 dollars 
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Figure II.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND THE WORLD: PRICES, COSTS 


















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Baker Hughes, “International 
rig counts”, 2012 [online] http://investor.shareholder.com/bhi/rig_counts/rc_index.cfm; BP p.l.c., “Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2012” [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview; International Energy Agency (IEA), International 
Energy Outlook 2011, Washington, D.C., September 2011; IHS CERA, “IHS-CERA: Capital Costs”, 2012 [online] 
http://www.ihs.com/info/cera/ihsindexes/index.aspx. 
a  The operating and investment costs indices were prepared on the basis of nominal costs for a portfolio of exploration and 
production projects considered to be globally representative that are calculated periodically by IHS-CERA, a consultant. The 
number of drilling rigs is the average number of active oil and natural gas rigs. This is calculated periodically by Baker and 
Hughes, an oil services firm. 
 
 
 The global economic crisis that broke out in mid-2008 resulted in consumption and production 
falling by about 1% in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2009. The shrinking of the global market, the 
difficult financing environment, the drop in oil prices and the rise in investment and operating costs not 
only reduced activity in the sector but led to delays and cancellations in exploration and development 
projects throughout the world, a 15% reduction in the value of investment plans over the year before, and 
possibly an increase in the rate of decline in Latin American fields (IEA, 2009). 
 
 In the last decade or so, production and consumption have grown by more for natural gas than for 
oil. Both globally and in Latin America, there has been a gradual tendency for primary solid fuels to be 
replaced by natural gas, which, being less polluting, has a far more moderate impact on the environment 
(see figure 1 in the annex). 
 
 The evolution of the oil market since 2000 has been characterized by rapid demand growth in 
emerging markets (such as China and India), and this, together with supply constraints, has pushed oil 
prices up to the US$ 100 a barrel mark. Prices have remained within historically high ranges despite the 
























































































































































































































































Drilling rigs (right scale) WTI index 2000=100
Exploration and production investment
costs index (2000=100)
Exploration and production
operating costs index (2000=100)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
39 
 The natural gas market has decoupled from the oil market. In the United States, the 
unconventional gas (shale gas) “revolution” is at its height, translating into prices equivalent to half those 
paid in Europe and Asia, where gas markets have narrowed. Demand for natural gas in the main regions 
has recovered to levels higher than those seen before the financial crisis. 
 
 Energy markets are going through one of the most uncertain periods of recent decades, owing to 
the repercussions the Arab Spring has been having on exploration and production and the macroeconomic 
consequences of the eurozone crisis. The pick-up in prices since 2010 (see figures 2 and 3 in the annex) 
has coincided with the political problems of the Arab countries, especially Egypt, Libya and the Syrian 
Arab Republic. However, it has also been due to structural factors interacting with the political situation: 
the pressure of growing demand from China, the likely increase in demand for electricity generation 





There are two definitions of reserves in the industry: deterministic and probabilistic. They are 
complementary and are estimated on the basis of geological, technological, economic and legal conditions. 
For a resource to be treated as a reserve and classified as proven, development and production over the 
lifetime of the reservoir have to be profitable and commercially attractive for the State or oil firm. 
Profitability does not only depend on selling prices and investment and operating costs but is subject to 
prevailing legal conditions, which affect both exploration and production contracts and marketing contracts, 
and to the fiscal regime for taxes and royalties, among other things. Reserves are accumulated and then 
certified as deposits are explored and resources discovered (mainly by means of seismic, gravimetric and 
stratigraphic analysis and the drilling of exploration wells), in the light of technical and economic conditions 
and legal regimes as discussed.4 
 
 In 2011, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had the world’s largest reserves of oil (ahead even 
of Saudi Arabia), with 297 billion barrels, and of natural gas, with 194 trillion cubic feet (see figure II.4). 
 
 With the Magna project, which began in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 2005 and 
involved the division of the Orinoco region into 27 blocks, reserves were quantified in situ. The 
accumulation of reserves between 2005 and 2011 was 270%. According to some analysts, however, this 
increase owed more to the certification of existing extra heavy crude reserves than to any particularly 
successful exploration activity (Fundación Bariloche, 2012). 
                                                     
3  On 5 May 2011, for example, the price of Brent crude fell by US$ 10 in a day. No analyst would suggest that this 
was due to structural factors, major alterations in exploration costs or the depletion (in physical units) of the 
resource on the basis of the Hubbert curve. Indeed, none of these explanations was put forward. The price change 
was put down to a factor as apparently remote from the oil market (although it is not so remote if the effects on 
economic recovery and aggregate demand are considered) as the expectation that the European Central Bank would 
not raise interest rates, meaning that the steady rise of the euro against the dollar would presumably be halted. 
4  As well as reserves being able to rise because of new finds, modern oil accounting suggests that this stock 
variable can rise or fall each year because of other flow variables. Consequently, account needs to be taken of 
revisions to earlier estimates (for example, when greater certainty exists about variables such as pricing, costs, 
the porousness of the reservoir or the recovery rate), enhanced recovery techniques (including the injection of 
natural gas or CO2 into reservoirs), the net balance of reserves transactions (in countries where reserves can be 
bought and sold by buying or selling the land they are under) and production during the year. 
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Figure II.4 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): OIL AND NATURAL  
GAS RESERVES, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 AND 2011 a 
(Billions of barrels of oil, billions of barrels of oil equivalent for total hydrocarbons,  





































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP p.l.c., “Statistical Review of 
World Energy”, 2011 and 2012 [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview; ENI, “World Oil and Gas Review 2010”, 
2010 [online] http://www.eni.com/world-oil-gas-review/pages/home.shtml; Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
“Country analysis briefs”, 2011. 
a  At year’s end. 
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 Reserves fell everywhere in the region except the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Argentina had total reserves of about 7.9 billion barrels of oil equivalent in 
2000 but no more than 4.7 billion barrels in 2010, a decline of 40% over the period. 
 
 In the case of Brazil, reserves estimates do not take account of all the resources in the Brazilian 
pre-salt layer5 discovered in the Tupi field in 2007 or of others in the Santos reservoir. These are expected 
to total 50 billion barrels of oil equivalent between them, and if treated as reserves in future they will 
almost treble current estimates. 
 
 As regards reserves of unconventional natural gas,6 both Argentina and Latin America as a whole 
could have the opportunity to certify technically recoverable gas resources7 once technology or regulatory 
frameworks make hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques economic and potentially 
applicable in the region’s countries. 
 
 At the global level, rising reserves of unconventional gas are expected to lead to its 
consumption increasing in the energy mix, to the point where it could even equal oil consumption in the 
next 20 years. This process will also allow natural gas price formation to reflect the costs of developing 
and producing reserves, irrespective of price formation and fluctuations for oil or oil derivatives 
deemed to be substitutes. This situation in fact arose recently, with a decoupling since 2009 between 
the almost steady price trend for Henry Hub natural gas and the upward trend in the WTI oil price 
(Bourland and Gamble, 2011). 
 
(a) Replacing reserves 
 
 The effort made by countries to replace reserves over time is measured by the reserve 
replacement index.8 An index value below 1 would signify inadequate (or zero) replenishment of 
reserves, a value of 1 would signify that reserves were exactly replenished and a value greater than 
                                                     
5  Reservoirs of crude that are beneath thick layers of salt under the ocean bed, deposited 150 million years ago. 
Extraction requires maritime drilling to more than 3,000 metres through water, rock and over 1,500 metres of salt. 
6 Unconventional natural gas is in hard-to-find underground locations and is characterized by high production 
costs. It is encountered, for example, in impermeable deposits (needing maximum stimulation and requiring 
substantial investment), in hydrate deposits or dissolved in formation water. It can also derive from in situ 
gasification of coal. The category of unconventional gas includes: (i) shale gas, which is natural gas encountered 
in clayey detritic sedimentary rock that is rich in organic matter and characterized by low permeability and 
migration; (ii) gas in low-permeability deposits (tight gas), which is the natural gas found in very compact 
sedimentary rocks of fine-grained sandstone, with low-permeability, low-migration calcareous, ferruginous or 
siliceous cement, requiring the use of techniques such as hydraulic fracturing; (iii) coalbed methane, the 
methane-rich natural gas found in coal deposits (ENI, 2002; IEA, 2012). 
7  These are resources in situ, discovered and undiscovered, that are recoverable (economic considerations aside) 
with current technology. These resources become reserves if they are discovered and prove marketable. The sum 
of reserves, contingent resources and prospective resources may also be treated as “remaining recoverable 
resources” (SPE, 2009). 
8  RRIt = ((Rt-Rt-1)/Pt)+1= ((Rt-1-Pt+DISt+RECt±REVt-Rt-1)/Pt)+1=(DISt+RECt±REVt)/Pt where:  
 RRI = Reserve replacement index 
 t = Period 
 R = Reserves 
 P = Production 
 DIS = Discoveries and extensions 
 REC = Enhanced recovery 
 REV = Revisions to earlier estimates 
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1 would mean that replenishment was more than adequate given production levels. The optimum situation 
for a country is to have a ratio of 1 or over so that it is replenishing reserves by at least the levels of 
production consumed and is not losing wealth or assets. 
 
 Figure II.5 compares the behaviour of the oil and natural gas reserve replacement indices between 
the two halves of the decade from 2001 to 2010, which is a consistent period for the certification of 
reserves. In the 2001-2005 period, with a price of US$ 36 per barrel, it can be seen that replenishment of 
natural gas and oil reserves in Latin America was inadequate (index values of 0.16 and 0.97, respectively, 
which means that just 16% and 97% of production in the five-year period was replaced by new finds or 
adjustments to earlier estimates). Replenishment of both was more than adequate in the Bolivarian 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FIVE-YEAR EVOLUTION 

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP p.l.c., “Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2011” [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview; ENI, “World Oil and Gas Review 2010” [online] 
http://www.eni.com/world-oil-gas-review/pages/home.shtml. 
a  Prices are the simple average of WTI for the reference period. 
 
 
 In the following five-year period, 2006-2010, the average price rose to US$ 76 a barrel despite a 
drop in 2009, and this served to increase technically and economically recoverable resources and improve 
the region’s situation. The replacement index for the region stood at 9.75 for oil and 1.32 for natural gas, 
with the main impetus coming from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Peru and, to a lesser 
extent, Colombia. 
 
 By contrast, Argentina and the Plurinational State of Bolivia were unable to take advantage of the 
price surge to accumulate reserves. This may have been due to different factors, such as revisions to 
earlier reserves estimates in the Plurinational State of Bolivia in 2010, rising investment, operating and 
financing costs (exacerbated by the global economic crisis) and regulatory aspects, such as the setting of 
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(b) Resource reserve life: the relationship between reserves and production 
 
 The abundance of non-renewable natural resources has traditionally been measured by the ratio 
between reserves and production or the estimated life of reserves (expressed as the number of years 
reserves would last at the production rate of the current period). This indicator reflects the reserve life of 
the resource at a given point in time, while changes over time indicate whether the reserve life thus 
measured is increasing or decreasing. 
 
 The reserve life of oil and natural gas in South America increased in the last five-year period, so 
that in 2011 it stood at 108 years, well above the world average of 58 years (see table II.1 and figure II.6). 
Without certification of the extra heavy crude from the Orinoco Belt, i.e., without the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, reserve life in South America would have been only 17 years, according to 2011 data. 
 
Table II.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OIL AND NATURAL GAS RESERVE LIFE 
(Years) 
Region or subregion 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 
Latin America and the Caribbean 46.6 36.1 32.3 60.2 74.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean excluding the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela 34.0 19.5 14.6 14.1 14.0 
South America 47.2 46.3 45.7 87.8 108.2 
South America excluding the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela 20.5 20.9 18.7 17.2 17.0 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP p.l.c., “Statistical Review of 
World Energy”, 2011 and 2012 [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
 
Figure II.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): RATIO BETWEEN  




















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP p.l.c., “Statistical Review of 
World Energy”, 2011 and 2012 [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
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 Colombia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are at opposite extremes where reserve 
life is concerned, with figures of 7 and 278 years, respectively. In recent years, however, rising 
Colombian production has been balanced by rising reserves, allowing reserve life to be maintained, 
albeit at a low level. Private- and public-sector investment flows in Colombia are expected to 
increase this indicator in future. 
 
 In 2000, Peru had the highest ratio between natural gas reserves and production, at over 700 
years, owing to the quantity of undeveloped resources in the Camisea gasfield, totalling some 8.7 trillion 
cubic feet, which amply covers the country’s production of 33 million cubic feet a day (0.9 million cubic 
metres a day). The indicator dropped to 200 and 50 years in 2005 and 2010, respectively, owing to the 
rise in reserves and production from 2004, which was the result of higher demand for electricity 
generation and a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export project in 2010. 
 
 The evolution of prices in international markets over time is another indicator of the relative 
abundance or scarcity of resources, reflecting in turn the behaviour of global crude supply and demand. 
The upward trend in international hydrocarbon prices over the last decade suggests that resources are 
becoming increasingly scarce. 
 
 
3. Production and consumption 
 
In 2011, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was the largest producer of oil (2.7 million barrels a day) and 
Argentina of natural gas (3.8 billion cubic feet a day). However, production decreased in both countries (by 
about -3% a year) during the 2005-2010 period.9 Meanwhile, production in Brazil, which was South 
America’s second-largest producer for both products, increased by about 4% a year (see figure II.7). Peru, 
Colombia and Brazil have all been successful in offsetting the natural decline of fields with higher 
production, recording growth of 13%, 8% and 4%, respectively. 
 
 In the case of oil, higher prices and greater drilling activity in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and Ecuador were apparently not enough to offset the decline in output from mature fields, 
still less when production was subject to limits like those set as a condition of Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) membership, with quotas of about 2 and 0.4 million barrels of oil 
a day, respectively, for the two countries named. 
 
 However, the stance of Saudi Arabia, which is one of the leading global producers and thus has 
substantial influence over OPEC decision-making (and on the UNASUR countries belonging to the 
organization), has been manifested in pressure not only to moderate production but also to increase it to 
stabilize crude prices. Some analysts have pointed out that a situation in which prices exceed US$ 100 a 
barrel could be a harbinger of economic recession and thus of a reduction in world oil consumption, with 
potential medium- and long-run risks for the fiscal revenues of some producer countries whose economies 
are heavily dependent on their raw materials. Conversely, prices below US$ 70 a barrel are a disincentive 
to investment in projects with high development costs, such as extra heavy oil projects in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and ultra deep water projects in Brazil and Mexico, whose unit costs are put at 
US$ 115, US$ 60 and US$ 55 a barrel, respectively (Bourland and Gamble, 2011). 
  
                                                     
9  There are other methods of quantifying the decline of wells or fields, based on harmonic and hyperbolic approaches. 
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Figure II.7 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): OIL AND NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION, 
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 AND 2011 a 
(Millions of barrels of oil, millions of barrels of oil equivalent for total hydrocarbons 





















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP p.l.c., “Statistical Review of 
World Energy”, 2011 and 2012 [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
a  The exponential adjustment is for production of both natural gas and oil in the 2005-2010 period. 
b  Taking an average worldwide conversion factor for natural gas, calculated by BP p.l.c., of 5,610 cubic feet per barrel equivalent. 
 
 Another reason for the decline of production in some countries might be the inadequacy and 
slowness of the public-private investment response to higher prices. Furthermore, one factor in this 
response appears to be the difficulties created by technological and geological conditions, given the 
declining number of exploitable fields and the challenges involved in exploiting unconventional 
hydrocarbons, drilling offshore in deep water and developing extra heavy oil reserves. Accordingly, 
some analysts estimate that the price elasticity of the hydrocarbon supply is low in the region, at 
between 0.1 and 0.25 (Jenkins, 2011). 
 
 According to the international classification, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia 
and Ecuador produce heavy sour crude, while Brazil produces a medium sour heavy crude. These 
products have to be processed at special refineries, which is the main reason why they tend to command 
lower prices on the international market than light sweet crudes.10 Many of these countries’ investment 
plans for the coming years are focused on expanding and modernizing refineries to process and improve 
the quality of crudes of this type locally. While this would require heavy investment, it would reduce 
imports of derivatives, especially intermediates. 
                                                     
10  The denser oil is, the higher its carbon content, the lower its quality and the greater the proportion of heavy 
products derived from it. The oil produced in the Plurinational State of Bolivia is a special case because, while it 
is a very light, sweet blend, this is because it is mainly composed of condensate and natural gasoline, 
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 In the production of natural gas, by contrast, other liquid hydrocarbon chains such as ethanes, 
propanes and butanes are obtained in most of the countries. This is an important parameter in international 
trade, which operates in terms of energy, as it generates a greater sales value for the region’s gas production 
and opens up the prospect of industries such as petrochemicals being developed. Natural gas production has 
been increasing in almost all the countries in the area, the exceptions being Argentina and Ecuador. 
 
 Natural gas and oil consumption in the region has remained almost unchanged as a share of total 
primary consumption, although there has been a progressive substitution of oil by natural gas in the past 
20 years. Although oil consumption has fallen from 55% to 47% of total energy consumption, however, 
this is still well above the world average, which was 35% in the five-year period from 2006 to 2010 (see 
figure 4 in the annex). 
 
 In South America, the largest consumer of hydrocarbons in 2011 was Brazil, with over 3 million 
barrels of oil equivalent a day. In that economy, oil and natural gas are used mainly for haulage and 
industry. The next largest users are Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which consume 
about 1.4 million barrels of oil equivalent a day. In the former, natural gas is used for electricity 
generation and residential consumption. In Venezuela, oil is used for haulage, which is one of the main 
destination sectors for hydrocarbons (see figure 5 of the annex). 
 
 
C. THE TRADE IN HYDROCARBONS 
 
 
The countries’ primary energy consumption is met from primary production, net imports and changes 
in stocks.11 
 
 The ratio between production and consumption indicates whether a country is an exporter or an 
importer. An index value above 1 indicates that the country or region is an exporter, a value of 1 indicates 
that domestic production meets local demand and a value below 1 indicates the extent of imports 
required. The decline in the average ratio from 1.5 to 1.3 in South America over the past 15 years is due 
to two factors: (i) the decline in (exportable) production levels mentioned in the previous point and (ii) the 
growth of domestic demand. 
 
 By comparison with what has happened in the rest of the world, domestic demand growth has 
responded fairly inelastically to rising international prices for hydrocarbons. This may possibly have a 
connection with the various mechanisms used to subsidize fuels for automotive transportation and natural gas 
for residential consumption, which have dampened the transmission of international price changes to domestic 
markets in a number of the region’s countries. On average, Latin America and the Caribbean is a net exporter 
of oil and almost self-sufficient in natural gas, although decreasingly so (see table II.2 and figure II.8). 
 
 Revenue from hydrocarbon production is essential to the financing of the public budget in 
countries such as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia. In 2010, the sector accounted for 41% of total exports in Colombia and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, 93% in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 55% in Ecuador, and the surge in prices 
enabled these economies to improve their terms of trade by 35%, 56%, 68% and 30%, respectively, 
during the 2005-2011 period (ECLAC, 2012a). 
                                                     
11  The IEA has established that the total primary energy supply (TPES) is equal to the sum of primary production 
plus imports, minus exports, plus any change in stocks of primary energy resources such as coal, oil, natural gas, 
nuclear energy, hydroelectricity and biofuels, among others. 
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Table II.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO BETWEEN PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 
OF OIL AND NATURAL GAS, 1995-2011 
Region or subregion 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean excluding  
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 
South America 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.3 
South America excluding the Bolivarian Republic  
of Venezuela 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP p.l.c., “Statistical Review of 
World Energy”, 2011 and 2012 [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
 
Figure II.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): RATIO BETWEEN 




















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP p.l.c., “Statistical Review of 
World Energy”, 2011 and 2012 [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
 
 
 The decline in production levels in the last decade was amply offset by the effect of prices on 
export values. Whereas in the 1991-2000 period the volume effect accounted for 78% of annual growth in 
the value of raw material exports from the countries of South America, in the 2001-2010 period the share 
fell to just 35%. China is a leading destination, and increasingly so, for South American exports,12 as it 
has contributed about 22% of the increase in the value of commodity and commodity-based 
manufacturing exports in recent years (ECLAC, 2012b). 
                                                     
12 Having taken only a very small share of exports by value in early 2000, a decade later China accounted for 2%, 
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 Of the 185% increase in crude prices in the 2002-2007 period, the effect of oil demand from 
China is estimated to have contributed a share of between 10.8% and 27.1%, something that was reflected 
in an increase of about US$ 20 billion in the value of oil exports in 2007.13 Thus, crude exporting 
countries such as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador were able to improve their overall 
trade balance that year by between 10.1% and 21.4% in the first case and between 7.9% and 17.4% in the 
second (Jenkins, 2011). 
 
 The “China effect” also contributed to Ecuador increasing its hydrocarbon trade surplus from 
US$ 2 billion to US$ 8 billion between 2000 and 2011 even as its production to consumption ratio fell from 
3.2 to 2.2, with exports continuing to go to traditional markets such as the United States (see figure II.9). 
 
Figure II.9 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): HYDROCARBON TRADE BALANCES  
AND PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION RATIOS, 2000, 2005 AND 2011 a 
















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP p.l.c., “Statistical Review of 
World Energy”, 2011 and 2012 [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview; ENI, “World oil and gas review 2010”, 
2010 [online] http://www.eni.com/world-oil-gas-review/pages/home.shtml; and United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), UNCTAD Stat, 2012 [online] http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/report 
Folders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en. 
Note:  Arg=Argentina, Bol=Plurinational State of Bolivia, Bra=Brazil, Chi=Chile, Col=Colombia, Ecu=Ecuador, Per=Peru, 
Ven=Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 00=2000, 05=2005, 11=2011. 
a  The free on board (FOB) trade balance of exports minus imports (horizontal axis) corresponds to item 3 of the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 3 covering “Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials” other than coal. 
 
 During the last five-year period, declining production and rising consumption in both Argentina 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had a greater impact than the rise in prices, something that was 
reflected in a reduction of the energy surplus from US$ 46 billion to US$ 18 billion in the latter case and 
in a shift from a US$ 5 billion surplus to a US$ 1 billion deficit in the former. Thus, Argentina imported 
more liquid hydrocarbons and natural gas from the Plurinational State of Bolivia (by pipeline) and from 
Trinidad and Tobago (in the form of LNG), which resulted in a currency outflow of about US$ 9 billion 
in 201114 and was one of the factors leading to the nationalization of Repsol-YPF equity in 2012. 
                                                     
13  The value of crude exports from Latin America and the Caribbean was over US$ 129 billion in 2007. 
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 In Brazil, despite a production to consumption ratio of about 0.8 and a growing hydrocarbon trade 
deficit (US$ 10 billion in 2011), consumption for haulage was offset by ethanol production of about 0.6 
million barrels a day. Meanwhile, Colombia, with a ratio of 2.7, strengthened its position as an exporter to the 
United States and attained the largest hydrocarbon trade surplus of any South American economy, with a 
figure of about US$ 24 billion in 2011. Peru, although an importer of crude from Ecuador, is meeting a greater 
and greater proportion of its consumption from local production every year. However, currency inflows from 
the export of LNG from the Camisea field is not yet enough to offset imports of liquid hydrocarbons. 
 
 Thanks to an increase in its output of natural gas for export to Brazil and Argentina and to high 
natural gas prices (which were indexed to oil derivatives prices), in the last decade the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia achieved one of the greatest improvements in production to consumption indices, so that in 
2011 it had an energy trade surplus of close to US$ 4 billion. Nonetheless, the country is faced with the 
challenge of reducing rising fuel imports by increasing production and cutting its consumption subsidy, 
which cost about US$ 740 million last year.15 
 
 The countries worst affected by the price shock have been hydrocarbon importers such as Chile and 
Uruguay. In recent years, Chile has been a substantial importer of oil from Ecuador and LNG from Equatorial 
Guinea, Egypt and Trinidad and Tobago, something that is reflected in an index value of 0.1. This dynamic has 
resulted in a growing hydrocarbon trade deficit, which stood at US$ 16 billion in 2011 (see figure II.9). 
 
 The region has further diversified its natural gas supply sources in the last five years thanks to LNG 
(see figure 6 in the annex). The traditional method of supply via gas pipelines was not sufficient to 
guarantee energy security, so sea transport was turned to, contributing to an increase in world trade and, 
in some cases, making the energy supply less integrated. Because of this rise in consumption, natural gas 
now behaves like a commodity in much the same way as any oil derivative. 
 
 Brazil, the main producer and a leading importer of natural gas, has increased its supply of gas 
from the Plurinational State of Bolivia (via pipelines) and of LNG from Trinidad and Tobago and Nigeria. 
The situation regarding trade in gas has changed for Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
on the one hand and Peru and Colombia on the other. From being an exporter to Chile, Argentina has now 
become an importer from the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Trinidad and Tobago. Colombia and Peru 
have moved from a situation of balance in their domestic markets to being exporters via pipelines to the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and in the form of LNG to Spain and Mexico, respectively. 
 
 The Plurinational State of Bolivia produces the highest proportion of exportable natural gas, with 
a ratio of 5 in long-term contracts with Argentina and Brazil. This has made it the leading exporter via 
pipelines, with volume having grown from 1 billion to 1.3 billion cubic feet a day, representing a 4% 






Given that high prices (or low production costs thanks to propitious technical and geological conditions in 
some countries) may not be a sufficient incentive to attract the capital needed for a subsequent increase in 
reserves and production, other factors need to be taken into account. 
 
                                                     
15  UNCTAD, 2012. 
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 The act of determining and defining the ownership of hydrocarbon reserves and production 
implies that the owner will be free to exploit the asset and, furthermore, will be able to appropriate the 
revenues generated and access financing sources. At the same time, accumulating reserves serves to 
demonstrate efficiency and credibility in both public- and private-sector management. 
 
 From the standpoint of the State, a good oil contract is one that not only facilitates the 
development of resources but generates economic benefits through the appropriation of economic rent, 
venture capital financing and technology transfer by the private-sector party. The motivation of the 
private-sector firm, meanwhile, is to create financial value from globally diversified and profitable 
projects or assets. 
 
 Investment decisions are based on a country’s geological potential, access to favourable markets, 
judicial and legal aspects, the degree of institutional development and a stable and progressive fiscal 
framework,16 and on a positive relationship with interest groups. Insofar as these factors help to reduce 
risk, they will have a beneficial effect in attracting investment. Two trends have been seen in the sector 
over the last decade as regards policies on foreign capital participation, with different effects on regional 
investment volumes (see figure II.10). 
 
 On the one hand, Brazil, Colombia and Peru have been taking measures to attract private-sector 
capital as a way of ensuring investment in exploration and thus restoring their levels of reserves and 
production, which began to decline in the late 1990s. These countries allowed greater private-sector 
involvement in production by signing concession contracts with strategic private-sector partners; they 
allocated traditional and non-traditional areas by international auction (with local oil companies such as 
Ecopetrol and Petrobras among the bidders); they carried out fiscal reforms involving tiered royalties; and 
they issued exploration licences for longer periods. 
 
 On the other hand, countries such as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (since 2000), Ecuador 
(in 2010) and the Plurinational State of Bolivia (in 2006) have undertaken nationalization or expanded 
State control. The situation has been characterized, among other things, by the establishment of public-
sector ownership of oil production and assets, renegotiations giving rise to operating, service and mixed 
contracts, increased participation by State oil companies and a rising tax burden. 
 
 In addition, a number of firms, particularly European and United States ones, have sold off their 
assets in the region. Set against this, firms from China, India and other emerging economies (most of 
them State-owned) have shown an increasing interest in investing in the region. 
 
 The partnerships between private-sector and State-owned companies in projects relating to 
unconventional hydrocarbons in Argentina, pre-salt deposits in Brazil and extra heavy crude in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, among others, will find it challenging to make good on substantial 
exploration and production investment commitments, totalling some US$ 500 billion for the next five-
year period (see table I.3). For comparison purposes, it is estimated that sustainably developing natural 
gas alone would require some US$ 500 billion to be spent on exploration and production processes and 
US$ 100 billion on distribution, refining and marketing over the next 23 years.17  
                                                     
16  By a progressive fiscal framework is meant a more than proportional increase in the tax burden (X) in response 
to increases in oil revenue (Z), the latter being defined as the value of production at the international price net of 
production costs. A complementary definition of progressiveness is the increase in the effective tax rate or 
Government take (A= X/Z) when Z increases. 
17  IEA, 2012. 
51 
Figure II.10 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): FOREIGN AND STATE INVESTMENT IN 
HYDROCARBONS, 1996-2011 a 


































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the 
countries concerned; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNCTAD Stat, 2012 [online] 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en; and Standard & 
Poor’s,“Big spenders: Latin America’s national oil companies, Petrobras and PEMEX”, December 2011. 
a  Brazil and the Plurinational State of Bolivia consider investment received but not disinvestment in the sector, whereas the other 
countries consider net investment received, which explains the negative values for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 2004, 
2006 and 2007 and Ecuador in 2006. No information is given for Peru because the data for the period are incomplete. 
b  The foreign direct investment (FDI) amounts given are annual averages for the periods. They include greenfield investment 
plus mergers with and acquisitions of firms or assets by firms that are not resident in the declaring country. 
c  No information is available for 2011. 
d  No information is available for the 1996-2000 period. 
e  The data on Ecuador are for all natural resources. 
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E. MAIN TRENDS: PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND RESERVES 
 
 
(i) Rising prices and activity in the industry were not enough to yield a sustained increase in 
reserves or output to match consumption growth in the region. Further incentives need to be 
sought to boost investment (both public and private) in exploration and production activities. 
Brazil and Colombia were two of the countries that went counter to this regional trend, as 
they succeeded in attracting investment for exploration and production activities that 
improved their reserves position and the production to consumption ratio. 
 
(ii) Declining output and continuous consumption growth could lead to a drop in export 
volumes. Regional consumption is showing signs of being less elastic in the face of price 
changes, particularly in countries such as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador, 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Argentina. 
 
(iii) For countries that have a high level of fiscal dependency on hydrocarbon exports, matched 
by substantial spending, this trend could bring a greater risk of fiscal deficits, higher debt 
and a potential decline in net international reserves, among other things. 
 
(iv) With the exception of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Brazil, the decline in 
reserves to production ratios in Latin America and the inadequate rate of reserves 
replacement over the decade have been jeopardizing the reserve life of the resource and the 
region’s export position for the future. Colombia has a low hydrocarbon reserve life as it is, 
and the challenge for it is to invest to increase this. 
 
(v) A task that still lies ahead is to create regulatory, technological and investment conditions 
that allow the development of unconventional reservoirs in Argentina, pre-salt deposits in 
Brazil and extra heavy crudes in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
 
 
F. CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORKS, ECONOMIC RENT AND FISCAL REVENUES 
 
 
The fiscal regimes applied to oil under the concession system and the contract system18 differ from one 
another in aspects associated with the ownership of production, the type of tax instruments applied and 
the profit share of the State enterprise. Under the concession system, the Government obtains revenue by 
levying royalties and taxes. Under the contract system, conversely, the State is the owner of production 
and not only levies royalties and taxes but, via the State enterprise, shares the earnings from the business 
with the private sector. 
                                                     
18  The contract system is subdivided into service contracts and production-sharing contracts; contractors are paid in 
cash with the former and in oil or natural gas with the latter. In addition, service contracts may be subdivided 
into pure service contracts and risk service contracts; payment is fixed with the former, whereas with the latter it 
varies with profitability and market conditions. 
55 
 To make the system progressive, use is made of mechanisms such as tiered royalties whose rates 
vary with production volume or value, or with the share of the State enterprise, with a profitability ratio 
being applied in cases where service or production-sharing contracts are in operation. Applying fixed 
royalties and high levels of taxation that are inelastic to price or profitability makes the system fiscally 
regressive (Johnston, 1994). All this means that fiscal systems face serious challenges and are complex 
to design.19 
 
 With a view to maximizing appropriation of economic rent, States may require producing firms to 
pay taxes or duties on top of those payable under the general regime. Instruments for taxing hydrocarbon 
exploitation revenues can be divided into two: (i) those applied to gross production (or gross revenue) 
from the oilfield or gasfield and (ii) those applied to operating profits. 
 
 The main advantage of the first group (which royalties generally fall into) is ease of collection. 
However, there may be the problem that fixed rates are not conducive to efficient operation of the field, as 
the fiscal obligation arises irrespective of profits. Furthermore, in exploration investment decisions based 
on probabilistic analysis,20 a dynamic that is characteristic of exploration risk, modelling a fixed royalty 
for a prospecting project that has the potential to be successful in future may turn the present value of 
cash flow from the project negative, causing development of the reservoir to be cancelled or postponed. 
 
 Conversely, instruments applied to operating profits do allow fields to be operated efficiently, as 
market conditions and production costs are taken into account when calculating them. The core problem 
in this case, though, is the difficulty of oversight because of problems with information on operators’ 
costs structures. 
 
 Some countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Peru have been trying to secure the benefits of both 
mechanisms by applying production taxes and royalties at rates that vary in accordance with easily 
verifiable criteria, such as production level, selling price, well depth or some other variable related to the 
cost structure (see table II.4) (Medinaceli, 2010). 
 
 Oil revenues are determined by three variables: the price the hydrocarbon is sold at, the volume 
of production that can be achieved at any given time, and extraction costs (capital and operating costs). It 
follows that the higher hydrocarbon prices and production volumes are, the greater a country’s oil 
revenues will be. Conversely, revenues will decline as extraction costs rise. In summary, different 
combinations of price, output and extraction costs give rise to different levels of oil revenue. Over the last 
decade, however, the price shock has been the main determinant, driving up not only oil revenues but also 
exports and fiscal revenues even in countries where output has dropped. 
 
                                                     
19  There is also evidence from the region and the rest of the world that applying the same fiscal conditions to small 
and large fields, onshore or offshore, whether they are just beginning to produce or are at their peak, makes the 
system fiscally regressive. Consequently, both royalties and taxes ought to be lower for small, offshore and 
newly producing fields. See Khelil (1995). 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































G. THE STATE SHARE OF ECONOMIC RENT FROM THE HYDROCARBON SECTOR 
DURING THE LATEST PRICE CYCLE 
 
 
Because of the favourable cycle that began in 2003, economic rent per barrel of crude exported (the 
international price minus the wellhead unit extraction cost) has increased steadily, albeit to a lesser degree 
than rents in the mining sector. Table II.5 shows the evolution of rents in the sector and their 
appropriation via the fiscal and contractual regimes of the different countries. The period of strongest 
price growth (2004-2009) is contrasted with the previous period (1990-2003) for a group of countries in 
the region, including the largest exporters. The first two columns show the change in sectoral GDP and 
economic rent in the sector as a percentage of total GDP in the two periods. 
 
Table II.5 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): HYDROCARBON SECTOR INDICATORS 
AND FISCAL CONTRIBUTION, 1990-2009 
(Percentages) 
 
GDP share of the 
hydrocarbon sector 
Hydrocarbon sector rent 
as a share of PIB 
Fiscal contribution of  
the hydrocarbon sector  
to economic rent in  
the sector a 
Fiscal contribution of the 
hydrocarbon sector to total 
Government revenues 
 Prior to 2004 2004-2009 Prior to 2004 2004-2009 Prior to 2004 2004-2009 Prior to 2004 2004-2009 
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b  2.6 6.0 6.4 28.9 42.7 c 33.9 11.5 c 27.4 
Brazil b d 0.9 1.4 1.1 3.1 … 90.3 8.2 9.0 
Colombia b 2.9 3.7 4.9 7.1 23.6 30.2 9.4 14.2 
Ecuador e 0.5 0.2 12.8 24.2 58.4 38.4 30.7 29.4 
Mexico f 5.1 7.0 4.7 7.7 … … 30.0 35.8 
Peru b g 0.7 1.5 1.5 2.0 55.2 28.6 3.7 3.2 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) b  14.7 26.6 26.8 31.0 42.1 41.7 56.3 44.9 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT database, 2012. 
a  Calculated as an average of annual values (at nominal prices). 
b  Government revenues are for general government. 
c  Data since 1997. 
d  Data prior to 2004 are not considered because of statistical errors. Only data on hydrocarbon production as a percentage of 
GDP in the 2000-2007 period are taken. Data on the contribution of the hydrocarbon sector have been available since 1997. 
e  Hydrocarbon production data include the 1993-2007 period. Government revenues are the total revenues of the non-financial 
public sector. 
f  Data prior to 2009 are not considered because of statistical errors. Hydrocarbon production data include the 2003-2009 
period. Government revenues are all public-sector budgetary revenues and include tax and non-tax revenues. 
g  Data since 1998. 
 
 The third and fourth columns show, respectively: (i) the fiscal contribution of the hydrocarbon 
sector as a percentage of estimated rent in the sector and (ii) the same fiscal contribution as a percentage 
of all fiscal revenues in each country. In both cases, the fiscal contribution of the hydrocarbon sector 
includes taxes and royalties paid to the State for oil and natural gas exploration and production, not 
including taxes on domestic fuel distribution and marketing.21 
                                                     
21  It is worth mentioning some assumptions and peculiarities in the calculation that could give rise to 
overestimation or undervaluation or be an indication of greater volatility in the State share of economic rent 
(Government take). 
 In some cases, such as that of Brazil, it has been impossible to separate out the fiscal contribution of the refining, 
transport, storage and distribution (downstream) stage from total fiscal revenues. 
63 
 The behaviour of the State share of hydrocarbon sector rents, in combination with other indicators 
for the sector’s fiscal contribution, is characterized by the following stylized facts: 
 
(i) Generally speaking, the Government take as a percentage of economic rent is higher in the 
hydrocarbon sector than in the mining sector. In other words, the State succeeds in taking a 
larger percentage of sectoral economic rent in most oil-producing countries than in mining 
countries. 
(ii) During the 2004-2009 period, the dependency of total fiscal revenues on contributions from 
the hydrocarbon sector relative to the pre-2004 period increased in Brazil (from 8.2% to 9%), 
Colombia (from 9.4% to 14.2%), Mexico (from 30% to 35.8%) and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia (from 11.5% to 27.4%). It barely changed in Ecuador (declining from 30.7% to 
29.4%) and Peru (from 3.7% to 3.2%), while in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela it 
dropped from 56.3% to 44.9%. 
(iii) In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the average fiscal contribution of the hydrocarbon sector 
as a percentage of total tax revenues rose by over 100% between 1990-2003 and 2004-2009, 
increasing from 11.5% to 27.4%. This indicator is connected to the change in the tax regime 
applied to the hydrocarbon sector with the creation of the direct hydrocarbon tax and an 
expanded royalties scheme, accompanied by higher prices and larger contractual volumes of 
natural gas exports to Argentina and Brazil.  
(iv) In Colombia, the fiscal contribution of the hydrocarbon sector as a share of total fiscal 
revenues increased by about 50% between 1990-2003 and 2004-2009, from 9.4% to 14.2%. 
These indicators are consistent with the development undergone by the country’s oil sector 
and with the expansion of crude output in the last few years. 
(v) The fiscal contribution of the hydrocarbon sector as a percentage of the sector’s estimated 
economic rent ranged from 24% to 58% in the period prior to 2004 and from 30% to 42% in 
the latest period (2004-2009) for all the countries taken together, with the exceptions of 
Brazil and Mexico. In Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador, 
on the other hand, this share, expressed as a percentage of the sector’s total economic rent, 
was lower during the latest period (2004-2010) than in the period prior to 2004.  
 
 Given that the latest period was marked by high prices and an increase in hydrocarbon rents as a 
percentage of GDP, it would seem that the fiscal regime in the countries observed displayed regressive 
characteristics. In other words, the Government take from hydrocarbon rents, measured as a percentage of 
economic rent, fell despite fiscal revenues and economic rent increasing in almost all the countries. 
 
 This behaviour may be due to various causes, including rising production costs, which may have 
prevented the profits of oil companies (and particularly those that pay corporation tax) from rising as 
strongly as the economic rent estimated for the sector.22 It could also be due to the existence of non-tiered 
fixed royalties or tax rates that are inelastic relative to price (or profitability), as this could result in the 
fiscal regime applied to the sector adjusting much more slowly to market-driven changes in the sector’s 
economic rent. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 There is also a mismatch between the fiscal year and the calendar year. The former is used for the fiscal take from 
royalties and taxes, while the latter is used to calculate economic rent. Consequently, the fiscal take in a period may be 
associated with tax bases (and thus economic rents) from earlier periods. 
22  A high level of depreciated investment and large interest payments because of reliance on debt financing are among 






PUBLIC POLICIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF DRINKING WATER  






The UNASUR countries possess about 30% of the world’s renewable water resources. This represents 
over 70% of the water in Latin America and the Caribbean. Precipitation is distributed very unevenly 
across UNASUR, which means that there are some extremely arid areas. The seasonal distribution and 
annual variation of precipitation are also irregular, so that there are areas with too much water in some 
seasons and severe droughts in others. Another important general characteristic of UNASUR is the 
concentration of economic activities and population in dry and subhumid zones. 
 
 Although there is no case for speaking of a shortage of water in the UNASUR countries in a 
physical sense, it is important to realize that water management systems are often poor or non-existent. 
This situation is confirmed in the fourth United Nations World Water Development Report (2012), which 
points out that, notwithstanding its tradition of water management, the region has not yet shown itself 
able to establish institutions capable of dealing with water issues under conditions of increasing scarcity 
and conflict. 
 
 Climate change and anthropogenic demand have called the renewability of water resources into 
question. Droughts are intensifying along the continent’s Pacific seaboard. This has led to a reduction in 
water availability for a variety of uses in the affected areas. Conversely, the excess precipitation brought 
by storms, cyclones and hurricanes, if not properly managed, will result in complex problems for the 
operation and maintenance of installed infrastructure. 
 
 Development in the UNASUR countries is water-intensive. If the region’s development pattern 
emulates that in the developed countries, industrial demand should increase and agricultural demand 
diminish. Add in higher energy demand and pressure for it to come from renewable and sustainable 
sources, and water resources will come under heavy pressure. 
 
 Drinking water in the UNASUR countries accounts for between 10% and 20% of total extraction, 
and access to and enjoyment of drinking water are recognized as a human right since its main function is 
to sustain human life.1 Water is just as essential for ecosystems, which also capture and produce it. Thus, 
in the allocation of water resources, drinking water and water for ecosystems normally have priority over 
agricultural, tourism, mining, industrial and energy uses. 
 
 Once priority uses have been attended to, questions arise about the allocation of the remaining 
water. Multiple solutions exist, but there is a global consensus that water should be allocated in such a way 
that the interests, interrelationships and impacts of all uses and users are taken into account in the decision-
making process, in what is known as integrated water management (IWM) (Solanes and Jouravlev, 2005). 
                                                     
1 On 28 July 2010, under resolution 64/292, the United Nations General Assembly explicitly recognized the 
human right to water and sanitation, reaffirming that clean drinking water and sanitation were essential to the 
realization of all human rights. 
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 Hydro power has started to come to prominence on the public agendas of the UNASUR countries, 
given the availability of water resources with technically and economically exploitable hydroelectric 
potential and the prospect of volatile oil prices in future. The region’s hydroelectric generating potential is 
590 GW, of which almost half is in Brazil. Hydroelectric potential in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Colombia and Peru is more modest but still substantial. Installed capacity is currently 
137 GW, or 23% of the hydroelectric potential of the UNASUR countries. 
 
Institutional weaknesses and shortcomings (deficient legal frameworks, regulatory bodies and 
systems of governance) have been hindering the delimitation and coordination of the economic, social 
and environmental needs of different users and interested parties, and the situation with water use for 
hydroelectric generation has been unstable as a result. This is being compounded by water laws that have 
not taken account of the growing competition for the resource, especially in basins that have been heavily 
developed and have a concentration of economic activity. One manifestation of this has been the increase 
in socio-environmental conflicts over major hydroelectric and mining projects. It is thus pressing for the 
UNASUR countries to start mounting integrated responses to the challenge represented by the 
development of the hydroelectric sector, with consolidated water governance and participation by all 
interested parties, and to establish institutional methods for solving and preventing these conflicts. 
 
Some 95% of the population of UNASUR has access to improved water sources, with the leading 
countries in this respect being Uruguay (100%), Brazil (98%), Argentina (97%) and Chile (96%). The 
lowest coverage is in Peru (85%), Paraguay (86%) and the Plurinational State of Bolivia (88%). The 
situation with basic sanitation is far worse, as only 80% of UNASUR inhabitants have access to it. The 
countries with the highest coverage levels are Uruguay (100%) and Chile (96%), while the lowest levels 
are in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (27%), Paraguay and Peru (both with 71%). It is important to note 
that coverage levels are systematically lower in rural areas and among low-income groups, and that the 
data accessed do not take account of service quality (potability, intermittency and technology), which 
varies considerably between and within countries. 
 
Here it is worth recalling that service quality in the UNASUR countries, even in extensive areas of 
the main cities, is not always good. For example, many drinking water supply systems have problems of 
intermittency, and the coverage of adequate water quality monitoring and control systems is very limited 
in cities and virtually non-existent in the countryside. Other than in Chile (and, to a much lesser extent, 
Uruguay and Brazil), wastewater treatment levels are low or nil. Untreated sewage is often discharged 
into watercourses, leading to water pollution in rivers, lakes and coastal areas. 
 
UNASUR as a whole has already met target 7.C of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
regarding coverage of improved water sources. Although some countries have not yet reached their 
national targets, all of them are very likely to have done so by 2015 (with the possible exceptions of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Colombia). By contrast, the outlook for basic sanitation is not so 
positive: just five countries (the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay and 
Uruguay) have met the MDG target for this, while the others are very unlikely to do so. 
 
The present document reviews the situation with respect to drinking water and sanitation services 
provision and to the hydro power sector, then proposes concrete measures to deal with the challenges that 
remain to be met. 
67 
A. EFFICIENT, EQUITABLE AND SUSTAINABLE PROVISION OF DRINKING  
WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES 
 
 
Drinking water and sanitation services play a fundamental role in the preservation of life and health, as well as 
in the struggle against poverty and indigence, the equalization of social conditions, economic development in 
the countries and protection of the environment. 
 
 The satisfaction of people’s essential need to drink safe water and dispose of their bodily wastes 
in an environmentally sustainable way has been recognized as a human right (see box III.1). States exist 
to serve human beings and are therefore obliged to make their best efforts to reduce differences and 
deficiencies in access to drinking water and sanitation, particularly for groups that are marginalized or 
restricted in their ability to use services, with a view to generating greater equity (De Albuquerque and 
Roaf, 2012). Internationally, and in the national constitutions and laws of a number of UNASUR 
countries (examples being Ecuador, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay), the human right to 




THE HUMAN RIGHT TO DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION 
 
The human right to water creates an obligation for States to ensure that their inhabitants have an adequate supply of 
safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water to meet their personal and domestic needs. This last 
stipulation does not mean that drinking water and sanitation services need be free of charge for all but that their 
price can be afforded by most inhabitants. Thus, those who are able to should pay charges that reflect the efficient 
total cost of the service, and those who are not should be given access to a system of subsidies that progressively 
guarantees them basic minimum consumption levels. 
 The human right to water cannot be satisfied simply by a subsidy, however, as the construction of efficient, 
stable regulatory institutions is also required. Similarly, efficient service provision is essential to meet the human 
right to water, as availability increases when costs are lowered. Conversely, when costs are driven up by inefficient 
providers, whether public or private, it is to the detriment of the human right to water. Some of the most common 
forms of inefficiency include political interference in technical decision-making, high transaction costs, the loss of 
economies of scale when services are decentralized without proper analysis of local capacity, capture of the service 
by interest groups (whether investors, bureaucracies, unions or politicians), manipulation of accounting and transfer 
prices, and excessive debt. In short, efficiency and equity are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. 
 Efficiency in the sector depends on how services are managed, and regulatory frameworks, institutional 
oversight and control, political will and the economic, social, cultural and political conditions in each country are 
vital factors in the ability to promote it. Thus, the weight Governments assign to the human right to water is 
reflected in the seriousness and care with which they develop regulations and institutional frameworks. 
 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Circular, No. 31, Network for Cooperation in 




 The political decision to prioritize drinking water and sanitation services not only fulfils a moral 
and legal duty to protect and secure a human right, distributive justice, social peace and environmental 
sustainability, but is also an economic imperative, as it contributes to countries’ development and their 
participation in globalized markets. 
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 The efforts of UNASUR to increase access to improved drinking water sources as required by the 
MDGs have borne fruit. At the subregional level, the countries as a group have more than met the 2015 
target and have achieved 95% access to an improved source (JMP, 2012). Although some UNASUR 
countries have not achieved their national targets as yet, it is very likely that they will all do so by 2015 
(with the possible exceptions of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Colombia). 
 
 By contrast, the MDG compliance situation as regards basic sanitation falls well short of the 
success achieved with access to improved drinking water sources. By 2010, the UNASUR countries as a 
group had achieved 80% coverage, with the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay 
and Uruguay having already exceeded their national targets. At the same time, almost 80 million 
inhabitants of UNASUR still suffer the indignity and insecurity of having no access to basic sanitation, 
and over 17 million of these have to defecate in the open (JMP, 2012). A number of UNASUR countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Suriname) are unlikely 
to meet the MDG sanitation target by 2015. 
 
 UNASUR has the highest levels of improved drinking water coverage of any of the world’s 
developing subregions. Where basic sanitation is concerned, on the other hand, this group of countries ranks 
fourth behind the Caucasus and Central Asia (96%), North Africa (90%) and West Asia (85%) (JMP, 2012). 
 
 The countries have achieved what they have because the political will to invest in drinking water 
and sanitation has been there. The coverage figures show a major expansion during the 1980s and 1990s, 
followed by a slowdown in the early 2000s (JMP, 2012). This slowdown contrasts with the rapid 
economic growth experienced by the UNASUR countries since the start of the new century. This might 
indicate a certain lack of interest on the part of the countries, despite the challenges that remain. 
 
 The good coverage indicators of the UNASUR countries need to be looked at in detail, as they 
take no account of service quality (intermittency, quality of the water supplied, etc.) but only deal with the 
availability of infrastructure. This means, for example, that even when a house is connected to an 
improved water source or is close to one, the water thus supplied may not be fit for human consumption 
without further treatment, or may be available only intermittently. 
 
 There are no homogeneous service quality indicators for UNASUR, even though the Association 
of Water and Sanitation Regulatory Entities of the Americas (ADERASA) has made an effort to generate 
comparative statistics. For example, its data indicate that in a universe of just 16 service providers, about 
90% of drinking water analyses meet national standards (ADERASA, 2012). Unfortunately, statistics are 
only available for a very small group of the better (and usually larger) service providers, and almost never 
in a systematized, consistent or comparable form. 
 
 
1. The contribution of drinking water and sanitation services to economic development,  
social equity and environmental sustainability  
 
Drinking water and sanitation services are an integral element in the current and future development of 
the UNASUR countries. 
 
 Both Lentini (2011) and Hantke-Domas and Jouravlev (2011) have highlighted the influence, 
both positive and negative (when access is lacking or quality poor), that these services can have on public 
health, poverty, social inclusion and cohesion, trade, agriculture, tourism, implicit public debt, the gender 
divide and social peace. 
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 From an economic perspective, investing in the sector stimulates an increase in family income by 
diminishing the incidence of waterborne diseases, reducing absenteeism from work and school 
(particularly among females) and cutting supply costs. The effect of all this is to reduce poverty and 
indigence2 and free up time to invest in other activities (leisure, education and work, for instance), which 
increases a country’s productivity (Hantke-Domas and Jouravlev, 2011). 
 
 Where health is concerned, it is clear that consuming unsafe (i.e., polluted or unpurified) water 
increases morbidity and mortality. The worst affected are the poorest groups and children, particularly the 
latter, owing to the high morbidity and mortality caused by waterborne diseases. Polluted water is also a 
direct cause of malnutrition, as diarrhoea and other dietary infections prevent nutrients from being 
properly absorbed by the intestine (Lentini, 2010). 
 
 On top of all this, there is the cost burden placed on the health-care systems that treat these 
diseases. From the perspective of users, particularly the most vulnerable groups, the money spent to 
mitigate these diseases has a major impact on the household budget. For one thing, controlling waterborne 
diseases is usually expensive, since bottled water or distribution by tanker truck are the only options when 
there is no water supply or it is of poor quality.3 The need to buy safe water cuts into the family budget, so 
that there is less money available for other goods such as education or work. For another, it takes a long time 
to recover from a waterborne disease —time that could have been spent on other activities— and this affects 
labour market participation. Furthermore, money has to be spent on medicines and doctors (Hantke-Domas 
and Jouravlev, 2011). 
 
 The purpose of investing in sanitation and control of liquid household and industrial waste is to 
dispose of these wastewaters in a way that is environmentally compatible with surface and underground 
waters. This gives a country a direct competitive advantage by increasing health security and improving 
the quality of the water used for agriculture and irrigation. Positive externalities arise because health 
security opens up access to highly demanding external markets with greater purchasing power and 
improves domestic trade. Tourism also benefits from health security, as safer destinations have an extra 
comparative advantage (Hantke-Domas and Jouravlev, 2011). 
 
 Large-scale access to high-quality drinking water and sanitation services reduces political 
instability and contributes to social peace. This is because of the essential role these public services play 
in people’s lives, as those who lack access to them —because they are unavailable or of poor quality, 
unaffordable or inefficient due to weak regulatory systems and capture— are frustrated in their 
expectations. This frustration can sometimes lead to political and social explosions like the “water war” in 
Cochabamba in 2000 or the social conflict in Tucumán in 1997 (Hantke-Domas and Jouravlev, 2011). 
 
 Drinking water and sanitation services are perceived as essentially infrastructure-driven, so that 
all problems arising with them tend to be viewed through the prism of increased investment in public 
works. More carefully considered, however, water resources —and ecosystems— are an essential input 
requiring protection. 
                                                     
2 In Lima, being connected to the public drinking water system is associated with a rise of 5% in the incomes of 
families in extreme poverty (Garrido-Lecca, 2010). Since non-discretionary costs take up as much as 50% of 
nominal incomes, however, this represents an increase of 10% in disposable incomes. Furthermore, there are 
additional health-care savings (owing to the disappearance of episodes of acute diarrhoea) of about 4% of 
disposable income, giving an overall disposable income increase of 14% each month. 
3 These sources of supply can be as much as 10 or 20 times as expensive as a mains supply without providing the 
same level of quality or safety. 
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 In the work of governments, the public debate and international water conferences alike, it is very 
common for the emphasis to be placed almost exclusively on drinking water and sanitation services and 
for this sectoral concern to be decoupled from the broader need to improve the capacity for managing 
water as a natural resource (Dourojeanni and Jouravlev, 2002; Jouravlev, 2002). Expanded service 
coverage will mean increased use of water, a resource for which there is already intense competition in 
many basins, particularly from irrigated agriculture on the outskirts of cities located in the subregion’s 
arid and semiarid zones. The same is true of discharged wastewater, which is one of the main sources of 
water pollution and has now reached critical proportions, particularly downstream of major urban areas. 
This is why good water management systems are an indispensable requirement for progress towards 
sustainable and lasting solutions to drinking water and sanitation problems, something that entails, among 
other things (Solanes and Jouravlev, 2005):  
 
(i) modern water legislation that adequately responds to the nature of the problems involved in 
exploiting this resource and that is in tune with the thinking and practices of society; 
(ii) a water authority that is independent of sectoral interests, with a remit, powers and resources 
commensurate with its responsibilities; 
(iii) an efficient system of observation and monitoring, registration and logging of water uses and 
users, and of conflict resolution; 
(iv) a water allocation (and reallocation) system that promotes investment in development and 
conservation of this resource while at the same time ensuring efficient and orderly use, 
preventing monopolization and allowing public interest oversight to be exercised; 
(v) a water pollution control system capable of mobilizing financial resources to fund the major 
investments in wastewater treatment systems that are required. 
 
 Linking drinking water and sanitation services to important ecosystems in this way guarantees not 
only the sustainability of large investments but the very existence of human settlements. To put it another 
way, unless the sustainability of ecosystems and water catchment sources is guaranteed, any investment to 
meet the MDGs risks being wasted, at great economic and social cost. 
 
 Since drinking water and sanitation services benefit from the positive externalities that 
ecosystems generate (water-related environmental services), they should also contribute to their 
preservation, as should all other activities that benefit from them, such as irrigated agriculture and 
industry (mining, tourism and hydroelectric generation, among others). 
 
 A comprehensive water resources protection policy is needed to forestall and reduce 
environmental impacts and to repair damage accumulated in the past. Payment for environmental services 
may be treated as a complementary tool here, especially in countries with weak systems of governance, as 
it generates price signals for users, who thus recognize the opportunity cost of water and contribute to the 
financing of basin management activities. This is consistent with principle 4 of the 1992 Dublin 
Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, which establishes that “water has an economic value 
in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good”. 
 
 There are a variety of initiatives aimed at basin conservation, based on payments for 
environmental services in UNASUR countries, including Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. 
Institutionally, Colombia is a special case in that its tariffs for drinking water and sanitation services 
include an environmental charge for protection and decontamination of drainage basins and water 




2. Public policies for service efficiency, equity and sustainability 
 
Drinking water and sanitation services produce positive externalities, and maximizing these should 
accordingly be a public policy goal. Economic regulation is the best mechanism known for achieving this. 
 
 Drinking water and sanitation services are a natural local monopoly. The characteristics of the 
technology used in the production process makes provision by a single service provider in a given 
geographical area the most efficient solution. Without proper oversight, the service provider, whether 
public or private, will tend not to do its utmost to provide a high-quality service at the lowest possible 
cost. In addition, experience shows that service providers are extremely vulnerable to capture by interest 
groups, be these unions, political groupings, bureaucracies or investors. This sector consequently needs to 
be regulated to ensure that providers make services available at the lowest possible cost (productive 
efficiency) and consumers are given access to these services at rates that accurately reflect those 
minimum costs (allocative efficiency). 
 
 The performance of the drinking water and sanitation system in general, and the effectiveness of 
economic regulation in particular, are influenced by both exogenous and endogenous factors. Among the 
main exogenous or external factors are general macroeconomic policies, the priority given to the sector in 
Government policymaking, the management of water resources and the quality of institutions. The main 
endogenous or internal factors include the institutional, industrial and ownership structure, the regulatory 
framework, financing, charging and subsidy policies, and the sequencing of reforms (Lentini, 2011). 
 
(a) The importance of non-regulatory factors 
 
 The provision of drinking water and sanitation services is part of the whole functioning of a 
country, and is therefore not immune to a variety of external events that may influence the sector’s 
policies and performance. Thus, for example, macroeconomic stability combined with socioeconomic 
growth normally results in higher incomes for a country’s inhabitants. In turn, the greater availability of 
financing means that States can invest in infrastructure and people can pay for essential services. The 
general performance of the economy also affects service operating and maintenance costs and financing 
policies. Service provision starts to be underfunded and to deteriorate when costs increase and people are 
unable to afford them, so that the deficit has to be met by the State or outside donations, which on the 
whole have never been a major source of sustainable funding for the sector. All this makes the sector 
more dependent on political decision-making and the public finances (Lentini, 2010). The usual result is 
that technical decisions become highly politicized, which undermines the economic regulation function 
and the productive efficiency of service providers. 
 
 Poverty and indigence are another exogenous influence on the sector, as the poor cannot afford 
services. If States do not subsidize these for low-income groups living in situations of extreme vulnerability, 
service providers will be unable to finance themselves, which means that they will no longer have the 
financial capacity to provide a high-quality service and expand their coverage. This produces a vicious 
circle, as lack of financing results in the State failing to meet its obligation to implement the human right to 
water and sanitation by doing its utmost to provide services to the whole population. 
 
 Another exogenous factor is institutional strength and governance structure. Drinking water and 
sanitation services are provided in the context of a State that not only oversees, inspects and regulates 
them, but relates to them in a number of other spheres. For example, regulatory frameworks have been 
created to set the ground rules for service providers, generate institutional structures to enforce these 
rules, and subject providers’ actions to judicial and administrative oversight. The sector also relates to the 
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State in the tax, budgetary, political, housing and health spheres, among others. This is why the quality of 
its institutions is crucial to good sectoral performance. For example, the State needs to be able to rely on 
the technical capabilities of its authorities, which have to be honest and transparent, while allowing public 
participation and being accountable, these being fundamental conditions if service providers are to have 
an incentive to provide an efficient, universal service of high quality. 
 
 Other issues include the political priority the sector has for the government and the stability of 
public policies over the long term. Unfortunately, the drinking water and sanitation sector is not given 
high enough political priority in many UNASUR countries. If the necessary support is not forthcoming, 
then investment, regulation, oversight, efficiency and service quality give way before the day-to-day 
pressures that service providers face. This lack of priority, can be seen as a failure to implement the 
human right to water, as it means the State is not doing everything in its power to universalize the service 
and guarantee its quality. 
 
(b) The regulatory situation and efficiency incentives 
 
 Drinking water and sanitation services in the UNASUR countries present different states of 
institutional development. Some countries have adopted special institutional frameworks in which they 
have separated out the different functions: service provision and system operation; sectoral policymaking; 
and oversight, inspection and regulation. In most of the UNASUR countries, service providers are part of 
the public sector and operate nationally (as in Suriname and Uruguay), at the regional, provincial or 
federal state level (as in Argentina, Brazil and Chile) or at the municipal level (as in Colombia, Ecuador, 
Guyana, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia), but always with large differences within countries. 
Meanwhile, sectoral policymaking is carried out at the ministerial level and oversight, inspection and 
regulation functions are assigned to autonomous agencies. 
 
 During the 1990s, the sector underwent radical reforms designed to attract private-sector 
investment and management, with the twofold objective of releasing public funds for other areas of social 
policy such as health and education and improving efficiency through private-sector operation. 
 
 Since the 2000s, the sector has undergone a new transformation as private-sector participation has 
ceased to be pursued in a number of countries, while in some cases firms that were formerly privatized 
have been taken back into State hands. This has not led to any institutional reforms, however, and in some 
cases, it has weakened the regulatory framework. 
 
(i) Countries that have regulatory frameworks in place and have sought private-sector participation 
 
 This group of countries restructured the sector during the 1990s with the specific aim of creating 
the conditions necessary to attract private-sector investment. The rationale for this strategy was to create a 
reliable legal environment for private investors to be able to take control —and in some cases 
ownership— of drinking water and sanitation service providers. Common to this rationale was the 
perception that service provision by public-sector firms was inadequate.4 
                                                     
4 Although there are many arguments to suggest that private-sector drinking water and sanitation firms ought to be 
more efficient than their public-sector counterparts, the evidence from empirical studies on the efficiency effects 
of the different types of ownership is debatable (Renzetti and Dupont, 2003). The most important conclusion is 
that when the level of competition is low and firms are heavily regulated (as inevitably happens in the sector), 
there are not many empirical elements to justify, in general terms, a preference for one type of ownership or the 
other (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). In other words, efficiency in this sector depends more on institutional and 
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 The dominant ideology at the time the sector was being restructured and private investment 
sought was the supposed superiority, where management and investment were concerned, of private-
sector provision over the public model. England and Wales, which had completely privatized their 
drinking water and sanitation industry in 1989, were seen as an example to follow. Other countries that 
inspired the sector’s restructuring were the United States, which had over a century’s experience in 
regulating private-sector service provision, and France, which devolved management —but not ownership 
of assets— to the private sector under contracts of various kinds. 
 
 To bring in the private sector, Anglo-American models were used, albeit in a simplified form and 
with fairly light regulation. There were a number of structural reasons for this. First, Governments took 
the view that they themselves were irremediably inefficient and corrupt and that their powers therefore 
needed to be limited, while private-sector participation was seen as a goal to be achieved at any cost, as it 
would be immune from these difficulties. 
 
 Second, the political priority in a number of countries was to sell off assets, as this was 
considered an essential macroeconomic tool for economic stabilization, which meant that regulatory 
frameworks —whose main goal is to ensure efficiency of provision— were not a priority for 
governments. 
 
 Third, in a number of countries the development of regulatory frameworks and the involvement 
of the private sector occurred in a context of weak or poor-quality institutions and structural problems in 
State finances. For this reason, governmental structures had little negotiating power vis-à-vis the 
transnational economic groups that were supplying substantial funding for the sector. 
 
 Fourth, there was the belief, when stemmed from an orthodox and inflexible application of 
ideological models, that in modern systems regulators could manage with fairly limited and basic 
information on costs and demand, so that there was no call for them to measure the tariff base and rate of 
return. There was thus no need to develop the information access methods commonly applied in countries 
with a long tradition of regulation. Another factor was the belief that competition —through contract 
tendering, for example— would reduce the level of regulation required, so that there was no need to 
worry about developing traditional regulatory procedures. 
 
 A number of UNASUR countries opted to introduce economic regulation (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay) even though 
most service providers were still in the public-sector orbit. In Argentina, Chile and the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, the decision was taken to privatize the main service providers. In all cases other than Chile, 
some provinces in Argentina and, albeit from a position of much more limited private-sector participation, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Uruguay, private-sector operators pulled out during the 2000s, 
whether because of social or political conflicts (caused in some cases by tariff increases or non-fulfilment 
of commitments to expand coverage to more vulnerable sectors), disruption of the economic and financial 
balance of contracts, strategic global decisions by controlling groups or changes in policy towards the 
sector in the country concerned (Ducci, 2007). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
structural conditions in the environment than on ownership type. The region’s experience confirms that there are 
some cases in which different models of provision, public and private, function reasonably well and without 
major conflicts, and others in which, for whatever reason, neither model seems able to deliver acceptable 
performance in the medium or long run. 
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 In countries that did not privatize in the way that Chile and Argentina did, private-sector 
participation was confined to a few cities or municipalities, as in Brazil (Manaos, Paraná, Petrópolis and 
Ribeirão Preto), Colombia (with public-private joint ventures in a number of cities), Ecuador (Guayaquil) 
and Peru (Tumbes); and to build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts, especially for wastewater treatment 
and desalinization of seawater. For example, Colombia uses leasing and management contracts that 
usually entail no investment obligations but are limited to the operational aspects of service management. 
The country has also experimented with other types of contract and thereby succeeded in bringing in 
small local businesses. 
 
 In many cases, service provision was decentralized to the municipal level. This trend, which had 
already begun in the 1980s, was due to the belief that local matters —such as drinking water and 
sanitation services— should be resolved locally, with communities themselves taking decisions about 
matters benefiting or affecting them, the idea being that this would result in greater efficiency, 
accountability and social acceptance (Lentini, 2010). 
 
 The experience with decentralization has not been entirely positive (Vergès, 2010; Jouravlev, 
2004). Investment and operating costs for drinking water and sanitation services are very high, making it 
hard for small communities to finance them or run them to even a moderately high standard. Furthermore, 
decentralized service operation results in efficiency losses that can only be made good if service providers 
integrate or merge with one another to generate operational savings and take advantage of economies of 
scale, which are very substantial in the sector. Such decentralization tends to make local governments 
dependent on financial transfers from other levels of government (national, provincial or regional). While 
there are exceptions, these generally go only to service providers in large municipalities with high 
incomes or a high level of political importance, such as Empresas Públicas de Medellín in Colombia and 
the Municipal Department of Water and Sewage in Porto Alegre, Brazil. These exceptions 
notwithstanding, municipal service providers are not well placed to provide an efficient service, and this 
situation has often caused serious problems. Conversely, the most successful sectoral experiences are 
those in which services are provided on a more aggregate scale (nationally or by administrative region), 
as in Chile and Uruguay. 
 
(ii) Countries that have regulatory frameworks and predominantly public-sector provision 
 
 This group of countries includes those that have created regulatory frameworks but have since 
renationalized services (many provinces in Argentina, Guyana, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and 
Uruguay) or have not succeeded in attracting significant private-sector participation (such as the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Paraguay and Peru). 
 
 These countries adopted regulatory frameworks originally designed to regulate and oversee 
private-sector service providers, which, according to neoclassical economic theory, seek to maximize 
their own welfare, so that regulation has to incentivize desirable behaviour (such as service providers 
reducing their excess costs) or disincentivize undesirable behaviour (by penalizing poor service quality, 
for example). The problems arise when these regulatory frameworks are applied to public-sector 
(municipal or State-owned) providers without considering its unique set of incentives since the public 
sector acts out of a variety of motivations, such as the general welfare, altruism and political interests, and 
does not necessarily seek to maximize profits. Thus, regulatory frameworks incorporating economic tools 
to control private-sector service providers have not been wholly effective in stimulating efficiency in the 
public sector. 
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 This in no way means that economic regulation does not make sense when the service provider is 
public. On the contrary, because these services tend to inefficiency by their very nature, regardless of 
ownership, independent oversight of their performance is essential. Likewise, there is a need to create 
tools to incentivize or disincentivize public-sector service providers in particular circumstances. This task 
is a complex one, as the very State that is providing the services is responsible for supervising and 
penalizing itself. 
 
 Against this background, the weakening of the regulatory frameworks seen in some UNASUR 
countries is a cause for concern. Monopolies tend to be inefficient unless they are well regulated, and the 
problem is heightened in the case of public-sector service providers, as the threat of inspection and 
sanctions is less plausible and effective when the public sector is overseeing itself. Conversely, many 
public-sector service providers, or their institutional owners, are politically averse to charging tariffs that 
reflect the true costs of provision (Ducci and Krause, 2012). At the same time, a great many regulators 
have lacked the technical and financial resources and the authority needed to exercise effective oversight 
of service providers. 
 
 Many UNASUR countries have regulatory frameworks dating from the 1990s that were never 
amended after the renationalization of the service providers to deal with the new circumstances. 
Exceptionally, the regulatory framework of the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires has been amended and 
contains some interesting components such as an emphasis on efficiency, insofar as this is consistent with 
equity, and the application of regulatory tools such as regulatory accounting (Bohoslavsky, 2011).5 
Specifically, this latter instrument has been effective in mitigating a number of availability problems that 
the regulator had had to cope with in the era of private-sector provision. Following cancellation of the 
concession contract and the return to public-sector provision, the position was taken that this tool 
remained fully valid even when the service was run by a State enterprise (Lentini, 2009).  
 
 Given the essential role of economic regulation in spurring efficiency and preventing 
misappropriation of resources, regulatory frameworks have lost none of their relevance. What has 
changed is the nature of the relationship between regulator and regulated, with some industry problems, 
which are unique to the sector, such as information asymmetry, worsening as a result. When only meagre, 
poor-quality information is made available by service providers, regulators cannot discharge their 
functions properly. Governments struggle to formulate public policies that adequately respond to the 
nature of the problems entailed in service provision and society has no way of knowing how service 
providers are really performing. All this has generated serious conflicts that ultimately only harm users. It 
is paradoxical that renationalization may have led to the abandonment of economic regulation, greater 
political power for service providers, information opacity and a loss of accountability, while in some 
cases even affecting financial sustainability. 
 
 At the same time, the political power of certain service providers (chiefly enterprises operating on 
a large geographical scale), sometimes with support from other parts of the executive, has enabled them to 
simply ignore regulators’ instructions (Ducci and Krause, 2012). A weak regulator does not have the 
                                                     
5 With this framework, which is laid down in Act No. 26221, what is meant by efficient provision is provision 
that, “while meeting the goals and targets laid down by the competent authorities, is based on optimization of the 
resources used in terms both of unit cost and the quantity of inputs used, in accordance with good financial and 
technical practices and in consideration of the market cost of inputs, both in Argentina and abroad, and the 
quantity of inputs required by other water and sanitation service enterprises to meet similar goals, both in 
Argentina and abroad, in the light of consistent and comparable data that are available to the public, service 
providers, contractors and the public authorities”. 
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power to enforce its orders, since penalty mechanisms have usually been designed for private-sector 
service providers and are relatively ineffective for public-sector ones.6 
 
 There are also weak service providers, particularly the smallest ones, which are so 
underresourced that in practice they are unable to comply with regulators’ instructions (Ducci and Krause, 
2012). Another common problem is the rigidity of the legal regime to which public-sector service 
providers are subject because they are handling State funds. Understandable though the aims of fiscal 
protection rules may be, they are counterproductive to the extent that they trammel the efficiency of 
service management. 
 
 Seen in perspective, the 1990s regulatory frameworks have been unable to cope effectively with 
renationalized drinking water and sanitation services. The challenge now is to determine how public-
sector service providers (and their institutional owners) with political power can be overseen so that they 
do not lapse into inefficiency, thus harming users. One possible solution is to foment independence, 
autonomy and self-financing for service providers, as political and budgetary dependence is thereby 
reduced. Another alternative is to create a competitive investment fund to which service providers must 
submit their projects, as this can improve their efficiency. 
 
 It is also imperative to strengthen the position of the regulator, particularly in its dealings with an 
empowered public-sector provider, and for this it needs to be given strong information-gathering, 
oversight and inspection powers. Industry benchmarking is crucial, as it allows both institutional owners 
and users to understand precisely what kind of service is being provided. This generates reactions among 
users, who then approach their political representatives to press for improved performance by service 
providers. Accountability is another mechanism that needs to be strengthened, both for the regulator and 
for the service provider, but at a much more sophisticated level than is currently the case in the region. A 
set of annual public accounts is an empty gesture unless it is based on objective and consistent 
information and there is open discussion of why decisions were taken and how problems are to be solved 
in future through explicit commitments with the different actors involved. 
 
(iii) Countries that have regulatory frameworks and sustainable private-sector participation 
 
 The UNASUR countries tried various strategies to attract private-sector participation during the 
1990s. After the general exodus of international private-sector operators, this public policy option 
continued to be applied only in Chile. Private-sector involvement in other UNASUR countries was 
ultimately confined to what were essentially more minor, isolated situations where the focus was usually 
more on operation or technology transfer than on investment. 
 
 In the case of Chile, the structure of the sector is the outcome of a long-term public policy with 
goals and targets around which a political consensus has formed, so that it has survived a number of 
changes of Government. Since this policy was shaped into a regulatory framework (amended substantially 
on only one occasion since its creation in 1989), its application has always been objective and based on 
technical criteria. The gradualism with which the new model was applied meant that the economic 
                                                     
6 It is essential for sanctions to be substantial enough for the risk of being subjected to them to outweigh the 
advantages of rule-breaking. To be effective in the case of public-sector enterprises, penalties have to be personal 
and not institutional (Solanes, 2007). Otherwise, the consequences of the improper act benefit the perpetrator but 
the costs are met by the State. There is also a place for moral or reputational sanctions, such as the publication 
and dissemination of comparative performance indices, which can be a good incentive to efficiency and help 
draw public attention to the sector’s problems. 
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regulator was able to mature and develop institutionally while it oversaw the public-sector enterprises 
concerned before private capital was brought in (Lentini, 2011). 
 
 The high quality of the State machinery in Chile, together with the low level of political 
intervention in the management of the enterprises, allowed the public-sector service providers to 
consolidate and improve their efficiency. They enjoyed reasonable autonomy in applying technical 
criteria, which strengthened their technical and professional teams and was a safeguard against high staff 
turnover and politically motivated appointments. In addition, efficient human resources management 
meant that picked managerial and professional staff could be appointed, resulting in a high level of 
expertise and specialization.7 
 
 The stability of the regulatory framework has been combined with an adequate level of technical 
and financial specialization of the regulator, conferring predictability upon the system (Lentini, 2011). 
Furthermore, the tariff calculation process, while capable of improvement, has not been subjected to 
interference from outside the regulator. Thus, the tariff model, based as it is on micromeasurement and 
economic regulation, generates signals that prompt users to utilize drinking water rationally and the 
service provider to manage it efficiently. Neither the regulator nor the service provider is concerned with 
issues of equity (cross-subsidies are not allowed, for example), as these are dealt with by targeted direct 
demand subsidies. 
 
 The goals and targets to be pursued through private-sector involvement were laid down prior to 
privatization, and the regulatory framework was strengthened accordingly. The sell-off of the service 
providers was carried out in an open, competitive way. Because the decision was taken to float shares, the 
capital structure has been transparent to the market since privatization. The regulator carries out its work of 
supervision professionally, with more emphasis on incentives for efficient performance than on operational 
oversight. Another factor enhancing the model has been the transparency of the general information 
available to the regulator. In addition to all this, a system of regulatory accounting was introduced. 
 
 An important characteristic of this experience was that the State enterprises being privatized were 
already reasonably efficient and profitable providers with close to universal coverage (Jouravlev, 2010). 
Consequently, there was substantial information available on the state of the infrastructure and its operation, 
which is not usually the case when service providers are inefficient or in serious financial difficulties. This 
meant, first, that investors could prepare rational offers and there was less risk (and thus a lower cost of 
capital) and less need for future renegotiations. Second, the amount of information available meant that the 
regulator was well placed to set tariffs that reflected efficient costs. As the enterprises were already efficient 
and profitable and had practically universal coverage, the impacts on tariffs were broadly reasonable 
(although tariffs have risen steadily and perhaps more than strictly necessary) and uncertainty was reduced 
in subsequent tariff-setting rounds, as well as in renegotiations and conflicts. 
 
 However, the Chilean model presents a number of failings that need correcting. The constant 
evolution of commercial and financial practices, both among suppliers and in the market generally, means 
that the regulatory capacity of the State needs strengthening (Espinosa, 2008). The tariff-setting process 
needs to be made more transparent, as there is still a high degree of information asymmetry favouring 
                                                     
7 A virtuous effect of stability in managerial and professional positions is that it preserves institutional memory, 
professionalizes the business and ensures that long-term objectives are kept in view (Bohoslavsky, 2011). 
Stability of employment is a guarantee designed to benefit the organization and its goals more than the 
individual, as its purpose is to protect employees against external pressures and subject them to the standards that 
guide the work of the service provider in the public interest. 
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service providers (Jouravlev, 2003). Also essential is the implementation of a system of transfer price 
controls for transactions between related enterprises, to prevent inefficient costs and the cost of firms’ 
other activities from being passed on to users and to protect free competition in related markets (Hantke-
Domas, 2011b). As for investment, there need to be stronger incentives for service providers to renew 
infrastructure, particularly that which they took possession of when they acquired ownership of the old 
State service providers (Espinosa, 2008). Lastly, the model enterprise system used to regulate the sector 
has shortcomings, both because of its complexity and high degree of information asymmetry and because 
it does not generate enough efficiency incentives (Jouravlev, 2003). 
 
(iv) Countries that have no regulatory framework or only incipient regulation 
 
 These countries are Ecuador and Suriname. In Ecuador, there is no general regulatory framework 
for drinking water and sanitation services. However, in the one case of private-sector involvement, a 
management contract in the city of Guayaquil, a local regulator was set up (this approach is also applied 
in some municipalities in Brazil). The regulatory framework is set out in a contract, a method of 
regulation which has been generally abandoned in countries with mature regulatory systems because of its 
numerous shortcomings (Jouravlev, 2003). Progress in expanding coverage has largely been achieved 
through Government financing. 
 
 Suriname does not have specific legislation for drinking water and sanitation services either. Most 
institutions in the sector are weak and underresourced in terms of financing and qualified staff (OAS, 
2005). The management system in the sector is fragmented between several bodies with little 
coordination between them, and lacks a clear legislative mandate. 
 
 Both Ecuador and Suriname ought to develop specific legislation for the drinking water and 
sanitation sector. Reforms are needed in both countries with a view to organizing the industry on a basis of 
greater management autonomy, transparency and efficiency; developing investment plans for service 
providers; carrying out strategic sectoral planning with the aim of reaping economies of scale; 
implementing efficient, targeted tariff regimes and subsidy systems with a focus on financial sustainability 
and equity; managing the sector’s financing in a coordinated fashion; establishing regulation and oversight 
of provision within a framework of incentives for service improvement and expansion; promoting 
efficiency, transparency and competitiveness in procurement and recruitment; encouraging civil society 
involvement in the development and oversight of provision; and using communication and education to 
create community awareness of the benefits of services and their rational use. There is an urgent need to 
establish a specific legal framework and reorganize the institutional system, with an overseeing agency and 
an independent regulator that are both independent of service providers. 
 
 
B. THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF HYDROELECTRICITY 
(THE INTERFACE BETWEEN WATER AND ENERGY) 
 
 
1. The current situation of hydroelectric generation in UNASUR 
 
The UNASUR countries have a great opportunity to integrate renewable energies into their energy mix. 
These energies have a number of advantages, chief among them being the existence of the necessary 
resources, the ease with which they can be exploited and their availability in nature over time. Of all of 
them, it is hydroelectric energy that has been gaining ground in the region, which possesses some 30% of 
the world’s water resources. 
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 The UNASUR countries have followed the upward global trend in energy demand, with growth in 
final electricity use averaging 3.5% a year, which is higher than the increase in total energy consumption 
(OLADE/UNASUR, 2012).8 As in the rest of the world, hydrocarbons continue to feature strongly in 
primary energy production. The trend has been a fluctuating one, however: their share fell steadily from 
71% in 1970 to 63% in 1990 before rising back to about 67% between 2000 and 2005, and although it 
dropped to about 65% during 2010 and 2011, it remains higher than it was 20 years ago, owing to the 




UNASUR: SHARE OF HYDROCARBONS IN THE TOTAL PRIMARY  

















Source:  Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), Energy-Economic Information System (SIEE), 2013 energy review. 
 
 
 It is also important to highlight the fact that the share of hydroelectricity in the energy mix rose 
from 3% to 5% in the 1970s and then to 6% in the 1990s before stabilizing at that level in the 2000s, with 
a peak of almost 7% in 2008. This growth is explained by the reform process and the dynamics of 
investment in the electricity sector, and by the commitment of the region’s countries to incorporating 
renewable energies into the total primary energy supply, with the support of regional initiatives such as 
the Brasilia Platform on Renewable Energies and other initiatives of a global character.10 
                                                     
8 Final energy consumption in South America is about 8 million barrels of oil equivalent a day 
(OLADE/UNASUR, 2012). 
9 See Hugo Altomonte’s paper in ECLAC/IILA (2010) for information on the development of the hydroelectricity 
sector. 
10  By late 2002, the Latin America and Caribbean region had already met the Brasilia targets, as renewable sources 
contributed more than a quarter of its total energy supply. Chief among them were hydro power at about 15%, 
fuelwood at 6% and cane products at 4%. Other renewable sources such as biomass (0.5%) and geothermal 
energy (0.7%) were marginal, and wind and solar power, although used, were not yet counted as part of the 
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 In 2011, hydroelectricity accounted for 11% of the total primary energy supply in the UNASUR 
countries, a far higher proportion than the sector’s 2% share of the world total (see figure III.2). Hydro 
power has thus been clearly demonstrating its importance in UNASUR, not only because of the 
availability of water but because of the sector’s development capacity in countries such as Brazil, 
Colombia and Paraguay. Brazil is something of a special case because, according to the World 
Commission on Dams, 91% of all the dams built in UNASUR (84% of reservoir capacity) in the last 
decade (2000-2011) are in this country. These large shares obviously reflect a State policy that has 
generated a plan to develop and build dams for multiple water uses, especially hydroelectricity. The 
region has huge technical potential to exploit water energy. Brazil has 12% of the planet’s surface water 






















Source:  For UNASUR, Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE)/Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), 
UNASUR: un espacio que consolida la integración energética, Quito [online] http://www.iadb.org; for the world, 
International Energy Agency (IEA), International Energy Outlook 2011, Washington, D.C., 2012. 
 
 
 Hydroelectricity, like all other energy sources, has been growing and now ranks fourth in terms of 




2. The sustainability of hydro power 
 
Hydro power can be exploited either by means of large hydraulic installations (what is termed 
conventional renewable energy), involving the construction of dams to exploit a head of water or 
difference in level, or by using the slope of a riverbed to set up a run-of-river plant (unconventional 
renewable energy). 
 
                                                     
































 The largest hydroelectric installations in UNASUR are the hydroelectric plants of Itaipú (jointly 
operated by Paraguay and Brazil) and Yacyretá (operated by Paraguay and Argentina). The Salto Grande 
plant (operated by Argentina and Uruguay) is not so large. It has traditionally been argued that 
hydroelectric reservoirs regulate the water flow and make it more constant downstream, thus ensuring an 
adequate supply of water in dry periods, controlling spates, allowing fertile land to be farmed and making 
navigation and water sports possible, as well as generating electricity (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2012). 
 
 Nonetheless, this type of operation has been heavily criticized from a number of perspectives. For 
one thing, it is pointed out that large reservoirs force out the populations inhabiting the areas to be 
flooded; for another, land is lost and water flows and quality are affected. All this has an impact on 
communities and ecosystems downstream (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2012). Another criticism is that the 
lakes which form behind large dams consume water because of surface evaporation. 
 
 By contrast, run-of-river or small-scale hydroelectric generation has been vigorously promoted as a 
source whose social, economic and cultural impacts are much smaller than those of large dams. The main 
advantage is that there is less diversion of the natural flow of water, making it unnecessary to flood large 
areas and avoiding the loss of land. It is also argued that this type of generation is more environmentally 
friendly, making it a green or low-impact source. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the 
installed capacity of projects of this type is normally far less than that of major power plants. 
 
 Nonetheless, run-of-river hydroelectric generation also has impacts. For example, it involves the 
construction of plants, clearing of land, diversion of water and installation of electrical connections (to 
feed the energy produced into the grid), which can affect ecosystems, the movement of sediments and 
flooding patterns (IUCN, 2012). As with large dams, run-of-river hydroelectric generation has social 
impacts associated with the distribution of water between different uses. Thus, in basins where multiple 
activities are carried out (farming, industry, cultural activities, energy, fishing, tourism and human 
consumption), tensions tend to arise either over the allocation of water or over land ownership and use. 
 
 The sustainability of water as a natural resource is jeopardized by three factors. One is the lack of 
formal institutions to deal with the problems of water allocation, water management, financial viability 
and the influence of the political and macroeconomic cycles. Another is climate change, which is 
expected to result in large alterations in water availability in some parts of the region. A third factor is the 
vulnerability of ecosystems, since unless determined efforts are made to protect water catchment basins 
and glaciers that carry water downstream, the resource may become more expensive or even run short as 
availability and environmental quality decrease. 
 
 It follows from this that unless institutional problems are dealt with, management systems 
adapted to climate change and important ecosystems protected, water resources may become a focus of 
economic, political and social conflict. Thus, it is vital for these problems to be solved if hydroelectric 
generation is to be a viable alternative energy source. 
 
(a) Social conflicts associated with hydroelectricity 
 
 Political and social conflicts over major hydroelectric projects are frequent in UNASUR, examples 
being Belo Monte in Brazil, Hidroaysén in Chile and El Quimbo in Colombia. Debate has turned on how to 
meet higher energy demand and minimize the social and environmental impacts that arise. 
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 These conflicts are not something peculiar to UNASUR, but are a global phenomenon. The 
negative effects of large dams are now regarded as increasingly unjustifiable (WCD, 2000). It is no longer 
acceptable for the authorities to take decisions about major hydroelectric projects and impose them on the 
community. Instead, an innovative approach is required to assessing options, managing existing 
installations, obtaining public acceptance and sharing out benefits. 
 
 Another of the problems with large dams is how little they contribute, once construction is over, 
to the local communities they are situated in. These installations are usually located a considerable way 
from the centres of demand, so that the energy produced using local resources is transferred to those 
centres and most of the financial returns go into the fiscal coffers or to shareholders in the form of 
dividends. Here, criticism has focused not on water use but on the equitable distribution of profits. This is 
a legitimate complaint that ought to be resolved politically by the authorities of each country. 
 
 Another challenge for hydroelectric generation is that it competes for water with other users of 
the basin. Perhaps the most recurrent complication arises in relation to the allocation of the annual flow 
over time for other uses that rely on storage in reservoirs. In many places, for example, hydroelectricity 
generation competes with other water uses because it manipulates flows to meet energy demand, which 
tends to be out of step with the seasonal needs of other users, mainly for irrigation. 
 
 These conflicts are often associated with weak regulatory frameworks for water resource 
management. The most common problems are a lack of transparency in water allocation systems, limited 
protection for existing rights, weak accountability mechanisms and lack of governance. The result can be a 
strategic advantage for hydroelectric generation because of the amount of investment it brings and the 
strength of its negotiating position relative to other uses. To avoid these conflicts, hydroelectric generation 
should be considered a matter not just for energy policy, but for integrated water management too. 
 
(b) The situation with shared use of transboundary waters12 
 
 Historically, the legal regulation of transboundary waters in the UNASUR countries has been 
essentially bilateral. The cooperation agreements signed have turned into a unified body of regulation in 
the legal regime governing the particular body of water concerned. Multilateral agreements such as the 
1979 Tripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, and multilateral ones such as the 
Amazon Cooperation Treaty of 1978, are the exception. And even then, when disagreements have arisen 
between the States parties to these agreements over the use of water systems, the countries have opted to 
seek solutions bilaterally. 
 
 This is due to the very nature of the region’s river basins. The size of the territories covered by 
basins and the geomorphological characteristics of these, the different historical and political contexts in 
which they have been regulated and the different ways in which their waters are employed mean that 
categorical comparisons cannot be established as regards the state of cooperation in UNASUR. 
 
 Nonetheless, this bilateral tradition does evince respect for the customary legal provisions 
regulating the use of transboundary waters. The prohibition on activities that cause appreciable harm is 
mainly reflected in the number of environmental conservation and sustainable development projects being 
implemented in the region. 
 
                                                     
12  This section is based on Querol (2003). 
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 As for the right to equitable and reasonable water use, it has been found that both reasonable 
exploitation and equitable distribution of benefits have been duly considered in agreements on the 
construction and operation of hydro power plants, as in the cases of Itaipú and Corpus Christi, and in 
negotiations over the allocation of irrigation water to each State. Conversely, the shoreline boundary 
system (i.e., the establishment of frontiers and boundaries along sea, river or lake shores) means that the 
riparian State cannot exercise sovereignty over or economically exploit the adjacent waters. Usually, the 
State with sovereignty over the waters supports this system but not the one that possesses the coasts. One 
of the drawbacks of this type of frontier is that coastlines are constantly shifting because of seasonal 
phenomena. A State will be ill-placed to exploit a water system it naturally forms part of if it is denied 
access to the water by a treaty provision. This dichotomy between the customary rule of the right to 
equitable and reasonable use of waters and treaty rules establishing shoreline boundaries has given rise to 
controversy between some UNASUR countries. 
 
 Turning to the matter of prior consultation (the rights reserved by Argentina in the case of Itaipú 
being an example), clearly plays a vital role in preventing conflicts between States participating in a particular 
transboundary water system or body. At the same time, periodic information-sharing between States makes it 
possible to step up cooperation and successfully conduct coordinated water exploitation activities. 
 
 Given all the above, it is safe to say that a willingness to cooperate is what underlies all agreements 
dealing with the exploitation of transboundary waters. Even where there are unsettled boundary disputes, the 
UNASUR countries have shown themselves capable of joining forces to implement water ecosystem 
conservation projects, as has happened in the San Juan river basin. In other cases, States have succeeded in 
overcoming their differences, making it possible to use water systems for navigation and implement 
binational development plans in the region, as has happened in Peru and Ecuador in relation to the Amazon. 
 
 It should be emphasized that the success of the projects carried out in these waters has mainly 
depended on financing from international organizations or multilateral financing institutions. Outside funding 
of projects in the basins of the Amazon (between Peru and Ecuador), the Titicaca and the San Juan highlight 
the importance that cooperation over the exploitation of transboundary water systems has acquired on the 
regional agenda. 
 
 Another development has been the growing concern of States forming part of water systems in 
UNASUR to implement projects by means of participatory processes in which special consideration is given 
to the wishes of local populations. This has been seen in the Corpus Christi hydroelectric project of 
Argentina and Paraguay. Public involvement is also a factor in the Strategic Plan of Action for the 
Integrated Management of Water Resources and the Sustainable Development of the San Juan River 
Basin, among other projects. 
 
 Lastly, it is important to stress that the UNASUR member States have expressed the desire to 
find peaceful solutions to any disputes that might arise between them when applying the agreements 
signed. The method of solution chosen varies depending on the water system or body involved. Thus, in 
some cases direct diplomatic negotiations are the preferred means of conflict resolution, as in the case of 
Itaipú. In other instances, the matter is referred to the rulings of joint committees, as in the case of the 
Amazon between Peru and Ecuador. Arbitration courts have also been set up to settle any disputes that 
might arise over the Corpus Christi project or in the Lake Titicaca-Desaguadero River-Lake Poopó-
Coipasa Salt Marsh system, and this is indicative of an increasing commitment by the UNASUR 
countries to ensuring that cooperation is not just an expression of intent but a primary objective 
translating into concrete measures. 
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 The very nature of transboundary waters makes cooperation between States necessary. The 
geographical, environmental, social and economic interdependence that is a precondition of their 
exploitation requires joint actions, even if only at the binational level. The utilization, organization and 
development of water resources necessitates constant, planned funding to ensure the continuity of the 
specific projects implemented in the region. Cooperation within the framework of UNASUR, together with 
genuine, effective coordination of the national policies of its member States, will mean that the sum of 




3. A proposal for sustainable hydroelectricity 
 
ECLAC has been promoting the use of renewable energies in the region for several decades, a 
commitment that has been manifested in the copious amount of information it has produced and its 
ongoing presence in national and international forums dealing with the issue, such as the International 
Renewable Energy Conference (Bonn, Germany, 2004). Since the last decade, ECLAC has been working 
in international forums, and particularly among the UNASUR countries, to support the measures enjoined 
by the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002) and the Latin American and 
Caribbean Initiative for Sustainable Development, which set itself a regional target of raising renewable 
energy consumption to at least 10% of the total by 2010. 
 
 Although UNASUR has comfortably met this target, the region now faces the challenge of 
achieving homogenization and integration in energy consumption, with a view to narrowing the 
subregional divides that still persist, namely: the heterogeneity of natural resources, supply structures and 
energy consumption, and the need to achieve institutional consolidation and establish the basic conditions 
for renewable energy promotion and penetration policies. 
 
 In 2004, ECLAC offered a comprehensive perspective on these issues and a guide to 
policymaking, and these have since been taken up by the UNASUR countries. They are structured around 
four major initiatives:  
 
(i) a renewed appreciation of the environmental and social benefits of hydro power in the 
context of sustainable development requirements; 
(ii) the contribution of renewable energy sources to the all-round development of rural communities; 
(iii) rational use of fuelwood and energy efficiency; 
(iv) the role of biomass and biofuels. 
 
 Owing to strong recent criticism of the hydro power associated with medium-sized and large 
power stations, this type of energy has been virtually excluded from the renewable energy context, not 
because it is intrinsically non-renewable but because of its environmental and social impact, i.e., its lack 
of sustainability. There are four arguments against high-capacity hydroelectric power stations with large 
reservoirs: 
 
(i) the displacement of populations owing to the formation of reservoirs and the flooding of 
large tracts of land; 
(ii) emissions of greenhouse gases (methane in particular) owing to the decomposition of 
waterlogged vegetation; 
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(iii) the slowing of currents and changes in the biota that can further the spread of pathogen vectors; 
(iv) changes in sediment transport affecting coastal regions downstream of the dam. 
 
 The region’s particular topography and rainfall characteristics hold out great potential for 
exploitation. These conditions need to be taken into account when renewable sources are being 
considered so that they can be developed rationally. 
 
 As regards the renewability of hydroelectric power stations, perhaps it is less important to settle 
on a maximum capacity below which they are to qualify as modern renewable or unconventional sources 
(usually only small power stations with a capacity of between 10 and 30 MW are accepted) than it is to 
lay down a minimum set of standards for their acceptance as sustainable sources, based on economic, 
social, environmental and local indicators. 
 
 As indicated earlier, using run-of-river hydroelectric plants (which do not require a dam) to 
produce electricity does not usually have an environmental impact. However, while reservoirs will always 
have some kind of impact, it is simplistic and often wrong to establish a direct correlation between 
environmental problems and hydroelectricity. There have undoubtedly been negative impacts at 
hydroelectric plants, some of them irreversible, but they are not intrinsic to the technology. Often the 
harm is not substantial or can be mitigated, as the thousands of units that have been operating for decades 
bear witness. In addition, stress should be laid on the importance of hydroelectric installations that lend 
themselves to multiple uses and can bring substantial advantages, not only for electricity generation but 
for fish production, water supply, irrigation, flow regulation (mitigation of spates and droughts), river 
transport, the promotion of tourism and the use of local resources, among other things. 
 
 Perhaps no other electricity generation technology presents such real and proven opportunities for 
integration and synergies with non-energy uses. Many hydroelectric plants throughout the world, and 
particularly in the UNASUR countries, have had substantial positive impacts in terms of local 
development, improved agricultural productivity and retention of population in rural areas. The key point 
is to ensure that hydroelectric projects adhere to the principles of sustainability and make rational use of a 
resource that is available and indeed, in the case of UNASUR, abundant. A number of premises can be 
put forward for this. 
 
 From the perspective of national policymaking authorities, project developers and electricity 
firms, projects based on hydroelectricity are the ones that have potentially the largest contribution to make 
to the electricity supply in UNASUR. Accordingly, an initiative for water, forests and communities has 
been proposed with the following premises: 
 
(i) Water power projects have a clear and beneficial environmental synergy with forestry 
projects. Any modern development of hydroelectric plants is associated with forest 
management, potentially a source of environmental synergy that facilitates the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions and capture of the carbon associated with these emissions. 
(ii) Hydraulic projects increase the robustness of electricity systems and offer clear operational 
synergies with wind power projects.  
(iii) Marginal expansion of existing reservoirs is a very economical way of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
(iv) Electricity from hydraulic plants has low unit costs. Hydraulic potential is well assessed 
and many possible projects have already been identified and specified. 
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(v) Projects have to be developed for communities, not against them. 
(vi) UNASUR has a great deal of experience and technical capability in the design and 
construction of projects of this type, which is an opportunity for business development in 
the region. 
 
 The way hydroelectric projects have been developed when they have relied on large reservoirs 
and involved the eviction of communities, the destruction of forests and the flooding of large productive 
areas, and the amortization periods of such facilities (too long in relation to the time frames of the 
procurement contracts provided for in some local laws) have been an obstacle to their acceptance and thus 
to their financing by banks. For this reason, there is a case for developing a renewed appreciation of these 
projects’ value to society and making a vigorous public relations effort to give them the positive image 
they now deserve. 
 
 This brief assessment of hydroelectricity in the region highlights the need to give proper 
consideration to renewable energies and correctly define the concepts of sustainability and renewability in 
the context of the UNASUR countries, where, alongside solar power (radiation or biomass) and wind 
power, hydroelectricity must be given a leading role. 
 
 All this has provided material for a variety of proposals for the UNASUR countries, most 
particularly (ECLAC, 2004): 
 
• Comprehensive environmental assessment of hydroelectric projects. Over and above 
their potential impact in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, hydroelectric projects 
also have to be evaluated in terms of their indirect contribution to forest management, not 
only because of the way they are constructed but also because of the way they help to sustain 
nearby communities. 
 
• The establishment of a code of conduct towards communities. It is urgent and necessary to 
spell out a set of universally accepted, locally and nationally supervised rules committing 
developers to a fresh approach in their dealings with communities affected by hydroelectric 
projects. 
 
• Payment for environmental services. One way of supporting communities is to make 
payments to developers for the environmental services provided by forests and see that they are 
passed on as incentives to those living in these areas. 
 
• Modification of energy procurement contract time frames. The value of water projects can 
be recognized by amending regulations to extend the time frames permitted in electricity 
procurement contracts for plants of this type so that better financing terms can be obtained. 
 
• Establishment of mechanisms to recognize the synergy between wind and hydroelectric 
projects. At present, electricity market rules are designed for individual power stations and not 
for comprehensive energy and capacity supply packages. The recommendation is that these 
rules should be revised and amended to recognize the synergy between wind and water projects 
and enhance their profitability by making them more cost-competitive. 
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• A comprehensive approach to basins. The multiple uses and effects of water are typically 
integrated in river basins. Accordingly, water systems should be treated as basins where it is 
necessary to optimize the benefits and minimize the negative effects of temporary and local 
variations in water flows. This requires the establishment of measurement, monitoring and 
decision-making systems and a major effort of inter-institutional coordination between central 
Government agencies and regional governments. 
 
• Provision for social liabilities and resolution of existing conflicts. It is necessary, firstly, to 
finish meeting the social liabilities resulting from the construction of dams and, secondly, to 
resolve the most important conflicts associated with the construction of hydroelectric plants, or 
at least those with characteristics that are acceptable under this new approach. 
 
• Public outreach and information transparency. For a renewed appreciation of hydro power 
in society, it is necessary for an intensive public relations effort to be integrated into the 
initiative so that projects of this kind acquire the positive image they deserve. 
 
 Lastly, successful governance of natural resources, including hydro power, requires the revenues 
from their exploitation to be redistributed fairly among all the actors involved, including an adequate 










CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
A. THE RESPONSE OF THE MINING SECTOR TO THE PRICE CYCLE 
 
 
The behaviour of the metals price cycle has resulted in the region’s mining sector enjoying a profit and 
investment boom, to judge by the rapid rise in repatriated profits, exploration budgets and newly 
announced investment projects. 
 
 The share of revenues taken by the State in this boom has been rising in absolute terms, but is 
clearly far from progressive, as most of the countries do not have adequate fiscal instruments to make it 
so under the fiscal regimes currently applied to the sector. While it is common practice in the oil sector to 
apply instruments (such as windfall profit taxes) that enable States to progressively capture windfall 
earnings during periods of high prices, the same is not true of the mining sector. 
 
 The current tax treatment of the mining sector in most of the countries is based on corporation 
taxes levied on declared earnings, marginally supplemented by royalty payments. These instruments do 
not ensure progressiveness in the State’s share of mining revenues, particularly during periods of high 
prices and windfall profits. A huge auditing effort, beyond the scope of most States, is required to 
minimize the temptation in the private sector to conceal profits and artificially inflate costs, particularly 
in periods of high prices. A more progressive fiscal treatment in the mining industry would require an 
overhaul of tax instruments to bring them closer to the theoretical model of taxes on the economic rent 
generated by a resource over its life cycle (resource rent tax). Aligning mining sector tax regimes more 
closely with these principles would enable States to capture windfall earnings during periods of 
persistently high international prices like the present and to introduce the progressiveness needed to 
ensure that the wealth generated by the exploitation of their natural capital is captured for the public 
benefit in boom periods. 
 
 However, the share of sectoral revenues appropriated by the region’s main mining countries is 
close to the international average (about 33% for countries operating typical private concession mining 
regimes, with no State enterprise). As for the small countries of the region, where mining activity is 
incipient, the multiplication of mining GDP and economic rents in the sector in the period since 2004 
indicates a growing untapped potential for higher tax receipts.  
 
 In Chile, a review of the relative contributions of the State enterprise and private-sector mining 
firms to the tax take from the sector reveals that the strategy of having a State enterprise can be crucial to 
raising the public-sector share of the sector’s economic rent, as more is achievable in this way than 
through progressive adjustments to the fiscal regime, which will always be influenced by tax competition 




Several conclusions about regulation can be drawn from these findings 
 
The fact that taxation of the declared profits of mining firms is the State’s main revenue-raising 
instrument highlights the importance for Governments of having independent mechanisms and specific 
indicators that can transparently represent the sector’s profitability and costs over the course of price 
cycles. These have yet to be put in place in most of the countries. The need could be partly met by a 
State enterprise acting as a control to reveal profit and cost levels. As things stand, Chile is the only 
country in the region with a State mining firm large enough to fulfil this function. Without it, the 
Chilean State’s appropriation of mining rent would be below 15%, or half the international average. 
This shows that the fiscal regime applied to private-sector mining firms in Chile is laxer than the 
international average. Peru seems to be similarly placed as regards the fiscal treatment of the 
international mining sector. 
 
 
B. THE RESPONSE OF THE HYDROCARBON SECTOR TO THE PRICE CYCLE 
 
 
Despite the apparent similarity between the metals and crude oil price cycles during the 2003-2011 
period, there are marked differences between the region’s mining and hydrocarbon sectors in the 
dynamics of prices, costs, rents and the State share of these. It is not possible to generalize about the 
behaviour of these non-renewable natural resource sectors or the results obtained by them during the 
international price boom of the last decade. 
 
 Since the upturn in the price cycle, rents in the hydrocarbon sector have increased in absolute 
terms, as has its fiscal contribution. In the hydrocarbon sector, however, the price boom has not led to a 
corresponding boom in investment and development, as it has in the mining sector; nor does it seem to be 
helping to remedy structural shortfalls in investment to expand petroleum output (which includes 
exploration as well as production itself) that date back to at least 1995 in Argentina, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador and Mexico. 
 
 In some countries, whether the sector is run by State enterprises (Petroecuador, PEMEX, 
PDVSA) or private-sector firms (as in Argentina until the recent nationalization of Repsol-YPF) has 
made no difference in terms of reversing the investment shortfall. Conversely, it has made a 
difference in oil activities undertaken much more recently in Brazil and Colombia, with Petrobras 
and Ecopetrol, respectively. 
 
 However, public-sector oil firms have played a key role in bringing the State share of the sector’s 
rent up to between 40% and 60% in hydrocarbon-exporting countries, a much larger proportion than has 
been achieved in mining countries. Attaining these levels of appropriation requires a direct majority 
equity stake or control of the country’s production through the State enterprise, or the use of progressive 
fiscal instruments (such as windfall taxes or tiered royalties) designed to appropriate extraordinary 





Several conclusions about regulation can be drawn from these findings 
 
Neither State ownership of oil firms in the region nor the regulatory or contractual frameworks introduced 
to bring private-sector firms into hydrocarbon production have mobilized the exploration and 
development investment needed to maintain the ratio between reserves and production and expand supply 
to match the pace of regional consumption. 
 
 The challenge now is to strike a balance between public and private interests with a view to 
achieving the investment needed to ensure that domestic markets are supplied and the region’s export 
position is maintained. 
 
 This challenge will require innovation in institutional arrangements, in regulation and in contracts 
to respond to the multiplicity of structural and cyclical factors affecting today’s oil market. There will 
also be a need to deal with policy distortions (demand subsidies) that militate against the efficiency of 
domestic consumption in the face of supply constraints that will surely be prolonged over the medium 
run, while the countries find solutions to these dilemmas. 
 
 
C. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
 
 
The countries of UNASUR have adopted different institutional solutions in the drinking water and sanitation 
sectors. Among the results obtained, emphasis should first be laid on the success achieved in meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals target for narrowing the divide in access to improved drinking water sources. 
Nonetheless, there are still persistent regulatory shortcomings that need correcting. 
 
• Prioritizing the drinking water and sanitation sector, in terms of both funding and efficiency-
oriented public policies, could translate into major social benefits for the UNASUR countries, 
not only because of its decisive influence on public health, and child health in particular, but 
also in the struggle against poverty and indigence, efforts to foster inclusion and social peace, 
the promotion of economic development (especially with new opportunities for export-
oriented agroindustries and tourism) and environmental protection. 
• Regarding investment, the fact that large-scale funding is needed to attain universal coverage 
and improve service quality, particularly for the most vulnerable groups, means that the 
UNASUR countries need to make an effective, long-term commitment to both financing and 
the development of strong, stable institutions. Accepting this responsibility will not only 
bring about the hoped-for universalization of services but will also constitute an important 
tool for invigorating the countries’ economies and combating poverty and indigence. 
• With a large volume of public money committed to drinking water and sanitation projects, 
particular attention must be paid to supervision and oversight of budgetary appropriations, as 
the infrastructure sector suffers from a high level of corruption throughout the world. 
Furthermore, transaction costs are high, particularly in procurement and contracting processes. 
• The economic value of water needs to become a larger factor in user decisions, as there is a 
need to generate awareness of how scarce and essential this resource is. An effective 
mechanism for preventing waste is to charge the full economic and financial cost of water. 
Thus, public policy in the UNASUR countries should aim to make its provision self-
financing by moving towards tariffs that increasingly internalize the cost of services. 
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• Given that some population groups will be unable to afford a water supply at self-financing 
tariffs, States need to devise mechanisms for direct or cross-subsidies to enable these users to 
meet their basic needs. If this is done, subsidies will become a vehicle for positive 
advancement in fulfilling the human right to water. Recognition of this right entails limits on 
cost recovery, so that the most vulnerable are not deprived of access. However, it is not to be 
an indiscriminate benefit whereby water is provided free of charge to all sectors of society, as 
this would seriously militate against the equality and sustainability of the system.1 
• As regards institutions, the UNASUR countries should work towards an industry structure in 
which responsibilities are clearly demarcated, in addition to designing effective incentives for 
all actors in pursuit of an affordable, high-quality universal service. This can be achieved by 
separating out provision, regulation and public policymaking into three different and 
independent spheres. Practice shows that this type of institutional arrangement makes it 
possible to establish the formalities that are needed to create incentives for service providers. 
• As regards the public model, the regulatory agencies overseeing service providers at the state 
and municipal level should initiate an appraisal process to ascertain the effectiveness of their 
incentive instruments (fines, publicity or personal sanctions, for example). For their part, 
public-sector providers need to become more independent of other public bodies that control 
them financially and politically. However, it is also advisable to use a number of enforceable 
practices to modernize what has been called the “open firm” (Bohoslavsky, 2011), an 
approach that is designed to prevent distortions in the operation of the business and abusive 
behaviour by the authorities through measures to bolster the independence of regulation and 
oversight bodies and, in particular, through user participation in the internal management of 
firms and in the external functions of planning, regulation and oversight. 
• User participation ought to be expanded at all levels and in all roles at both the regulator and 
the provider when the latter is a public enterprise. Promoting bodies that represent drinking 
water and sanitation users is a good initiative, as it enables them to convey their concerns and 
uphold their rights and interests more effectively vis-à-vis institutions. 
• The human right to water implies recognition of sectoral efficiency (both economic and social) as 
a correlate of the duty to devote the maximum of available resources to guaranteeing this right. 
Consequently, where economic regulation is concerned, the UNASUR countries should enshrine 
in their general legal frameworks (and not just in contracts, which have serious shortcomings as a 
means of oversight and regulation) the general principles of fair and reasonable profit, good faith, 
due diligence, the obligation of efficiency and the transfer of efficiency gains to consumers. 
Likewise, there is a need for systems of regulatory accounting that enable regulators to obtain 
information on technical and operational performance, the administration of property, business 
management and the quality of economic and financial decision-making in the regulated concern, 
as these aspects are not covered by the financial information which conventional accounting 
provides to the market. 
  
                                                     
1 The Constitutional Court of Colombia (rulings T-546 of 2009 and T-150 of 2003) has reaffirmed that the human 
right to water does not encompass indiscriminate free provision of public services and that users who do not pay 
for the service they receive are acting as though other users had to meet their personal costs and temporarily or 
permanently finance their debt. This clearly goes against the principle of solidarity (which, among other things, 
requires all users to meet any reasonable charges they incur) and makes it hard for firms to apply efficiency 
criteria in their service provision. 
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• It should also be noted that the scale of service providers is important in lowering costs, with the 
ultimate outcome of lower prices for consumers. There is ample empirical evidence that major 
economies of scale can be obtained by medium-sized and small service providers, while among 
those serving between 100,000 and 1 million inhabitants (and in some cases up to 4 million) there 
is a tendency for economies of scale to remain constant (Ferro and Lentini, 2010). Furthermore, 
creating a more consolidated industry structure in this sector provides a great many other 
benefits in terms of financial sustainability, social cohesion, management of catchment 
sources, reductions in transaction costs and improvements in regulation and oversight. This 
assertion runs counter to many of the decentralization initiatives that have been undertaken in 
the UNASUR countries. However, given the soundness and abundance of the evidence 
supporting it, the recommendation is to promote aggregation and consolidation in the 
industry structure of the sector. 
• Similarly, emphasis should be laid on the urgent need for full, accurate, comparable, 
consistent, relevant and timely information. Information is essential for political and 
regulatory decision-making. It shows what is working and what is not so that the performance 
of the actors involved in the sector can be evaluated. Without information, there is only 
intuition to go by, and that is not a good guide in this area. Information regarding not only 
drinking water and sanitation services but water resources in general is in short supply in the 
UNASUR countries. It is urgent for these countries to have accurate and reliable water 
information, and accordingly resources need to be made available for this at the national 
level. Information is no use unless it is transparent, however, and the same is true of public 
policymaking and the decision-making of regulatory agencies. The region has already made 
progress in this direction, but all remaining areas of opacity and non-disclosure need to be 
dealt with as a matter of urgency. 
• In particular, the UNASUR drinking water and sanitation sector needs to adopt management 
indicators to measure the performance of providers with a view to evaluating their efficiency 
and detecting best (and worst) practices. If possible, a regionwide performance comparison 
exercise should be carried out, both within firms over time and with other providers. “Historical 
comparison within a firm allows the ongoing service impact of management decisions to be 
visualized, while comparison with other providers replicates the conditions of a competitive 
marketplace and makes it possible to identify areas in which management can be improved and, 
potentially, to identify and analyse best practices so that they can be implemented for the 
purpose of improving services, subject to whatever adaptation is required by the circumstances 
of each particular case” (ADERASA, 2012). 
• Likewise, the UNASUR countries need to be called upon urgently to link the management 
of water resources to mechanisms for the economic regulation of drinking water and 
sanitation services. In the region, the work of sustainable water management (involving, for 
example, the protection of ecosystems and management of forests and surface watercourses) 
is usually dissociated from the work of regulating drinking water and sanitation. It is also 
dispersed across a multitude of agencies. This separation has to disappear as soon as possible. 
Service users should begin to internalize the cost of water production in ecosystems, since 
otherwise they will find themselves in a situation of scarcity sooner rather than later, and not 
because of management problems. 




 All of this, together with what has already been achieved within the UNASUR context, will 
provide a platform for responding to the Millennium Development Goals challenges that will have to be 
faced by the countries after 2015. Looking ahead, what are contemplated are not just commitments but 
genuine imperatives to protect and fulfil the human right to water and sanitation, and a renewed emphasis 
in the subregion on further progress with sustainable development, efficiency and anti-poverty efforts. 
 
 Lastly, the experience of past decades with the development of hydroelectric projects around 
large reservoirs (entailing the eviction of communities, the destruction of forests and the flooding of large 
productive areas) and the long amortization times of installations of this kind made it hard for them to 
obtain social acceptance and secure financing from the commercial or multilateral international banking 
system. Consequently, there is a need for the UNASUR countries to emphasize the social and 
environmental benefits of these projects and implement a vigorous public relations effort to give them the 
positive image they now deserve. 
 
 Evaluation of the contribution of hydroelectricity and a correct definition of the concepts of 
sustainability and renewability in the context of the UNASUR countries needs to be guided by the 
following: (i) a comprehensive environmental assessment of hydroelectric projects; (ii) the establishment 
of a code of conduct towards communities; (iii) payments for environmental services; (iv) modification of 
time frames in energy procurement contracts; (v) the establishment of mechanisms that recognize the 
synergy between wind power and hydroelectric projects; (vi) a comprehensive approach to river basins; 
(vii) provision for social liabilities and resolution of existing conflicts; (viii) public outreach and 
information transparency. 
 
 Lastly, successful governance of natural resources, including hydro power, requires the revenues 
from their exploitation to be redistributed fairly among all the actors involved, including an adequate 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP, “Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2011”, 2011 [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview; ENI, “World Oil and Gas Review 2010”, 




























































































































































































































































































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): DRILLING ACTIVITIES 
AND NATURAL GAS PRICES, 2000-2010 a 
(Number of drilling rigs (left scale) and dollars per million 




















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Baker Hughes, “International rig 
counts”, 2012 [online] http://investor.shareholder.com/bhi/rig_counts/rc_index.cfm; EIA, “Country analysis briefs”, 2011 
[online] http://www.eia.gov.us; Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) [online] http://www.ypfb.gob.bo. 
a  The price of natural gas from the Plurinational State of Bolivia corresponds the country’s piped gas supply agreement with 
Brazil at the point of delivery. The price of natural gas from Trinidad and Tobago corresponds to the contract for exporting 
natural gas to the United States at the reception terminal. The conversion from volume to energy units was performed using a 
calorific value of 1.04 MMbtu/Mpc, which reflects the average for 2009 production. The Henry Hub price is equivalent to 
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LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): DRILLING ACTIVITIES AND OIL PRICES, 
BY CRUDE OIL TYPE, 2000-2010 a 




















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Baker Hughes, “International 
rig counts”, 2012 [online] http://investor.shareholder.com/bhi/rig_counts/rc_index.cfm; EIA, “Country analysis briefs”, 
2011 [online] http://www.eia.gov.us. 





















































































































































































































































































Drilling rigs WTI price
Maya price (Mexico) Tía Juana Light price (Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of))
Caño Limón price (Colombia) Oriente price (Ecuador)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20102000
106 
Figure A.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND THE WORLD: PROPORTION OF HYDROCARBONS 
IN THE PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION MATRIX, BY FIVE-YEAR PERIODS 




























Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP, “Statistical Review of 
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SOUTH AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): OIL AND NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION, 
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 AND 2011 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP “Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2012” and “Statistical Review of World Energy 2011” [online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview; 
ENI, “World Oil and Gas Review 2010” [online] http://www.eni.com/world-oil-gas-review/pages/home.shtml. 
a  An average global conversion factor calculated by British Petroleum was used to convert cubic feet of natural gas to barrels 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE WORLD: BALANCE OF TRADE IN NATURAL GAS, 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of BP “Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2012”, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2011” and “Statistical Review of World Energy 2006” 
[online] http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
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